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As respective representatives of Romanticism, Victorianism and Modernism,
poets Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Alfred Tennyson, and Wallace Stevens differ
significantly in regards to .aesthetics, literary history, and biography, yet their work
shares one common attribute-the figure of aporia. Because this term-which can .be
succinctly identified as doubt or puzzlement-is not widely recognized, a historical
review of its various usages and meanings throughout history precedes discussion of
the three poets. A particular emphasis is placed on Jacques Derrida's classification of
three aporetic types, which are suggested to correspond with specific functions of
aporia and further define modes of debilitation, consolation, and production which
characterize the poets' aporetic approaches. Chapters on each poet include
discussions of divergences in biography and literary history to further contextualize
aesthetic intent and artistic circumstance. Although such an assertion remains
speculative, a cumulative analysis of the three varying approaches to aporia
ultimately suggests the possibility that the figure undergoes a.specific progression
through literary history.
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Introduction

A particular problem of literary studies arises when we consider the lack of
available methods of discourse needed to discuss how, where, and why poetic
language breaks down. To put it another way, how do writers treat and describe
moments of ineffability, poetic doubt, and creative failure? Furthermore, how do
literary critics identify and examine those descriptions which emerge when poetic
constructions malfunction? Tropes of malfunction appear in the poetry of numerous
movements, histories, and authors; however, three major poets whose works
consistently showcase such tropes are Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Alfred, Lord
Tennyson, and Wallace Stevens. Given the disparate nature of these poets' historical
circumstances, the poetic malfunctions which occur in their works necessarily
emerge in unique modes and manifestations, a fact which might be partly explained
by contrasting the poets' diverse biographical situations. Coleridge's intense personal
struggles with addiction, marital discord and romantic disappointment, and poverty
exert significant influence on his work. Tennyson, while he fared far better than
Coleridge financially, faced equally insurmountable difficulties: notable among
them, his depression after the loss of his close friend Arthur Hallam, a loss which
resulted in his major elegy In Memoriam A.H.H. (1849). Unlike Coleridge and
Tennyson, Stevens chose to separate his art from his public persona, at least until
later in life. An insurance executive by day, Stevens's literary activity surfaced
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alongside his business obligations, a fact which made the poet more likely to adopt
an experimental aesthetic. Stevens's work dramatically departs from Romantic and
Victorian aesthetics precisely because his poetry so closely embodies American
Modernism. Certainly these differences are significant, but what is most remarkable
is not difference, but convergence: the parallels the critic can draw between the
similar tropes occurring at the boundaries of poetic language and thought. One
possible theoretical approach which might allow a more comprehensive examination
of these boundaries, as well as an investigation of the specific functions and
situations of poetic malfunction, depends upon exploring the concept of aporia in
order to employ the term as critical scheme ofliterary analysis.
Due to the confusing nature not only of this term, but of its critical,
philosophical and rhetorical histories, a brief overview is both pertinent and
necessary. Etymologically, "aporia" can be broken down into two ancient Greek
morphemes: the prefix "a" meaning "without" and "poros" meaning "passage."
Historically, the ancient Greek verb "aporein" took on a more figurative meaning,
and is consistently translate<:! into English as "to doubt." The Oxford English
Dictionary includes two forms of the word: the adjective, "aporetic" which it defines

as "to be at a loss," "impassable," and "inclined to doubt, or to raise objections"; and
the noun form "aporia," which it defines as the "state of the aporetic" and "a
perplexity or difficulty." The dictionary also refers to early textual uses of the term.
George Puttenham's The Arte ofEnglish Poesie (1589) defines aporia as "the
Doubtful, [so] called ... because oftentimes we will seem to caste perils, and make
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doubts of things when by a plaine manner of speech we might affirm or d~ny
[them]." In another reference from 1657, J. Smith's Mystical Rhetoric, the term is
defined as "a figure whereby the speaker sheweth that he doubteth, either where to
begin for the multitude of matters, or what to do or say in some strange or ambiguous
thing."
More specialized resources also provide some background. In Greek

Grammar (1956), Herbert Weir Smyth defines the term as "an artifice by which a
speaker feigns doubts as to where he shall begin or end or what he shall do or say"
(674). William Harmon's A Handbook to Literature identifies aporia as "a difficulty,
impasse, or point of doubt and indecision" while also noting that critics have
employed the term to "indicate a point of undecidability, which locates the site at
which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or
deconstructs itself' (39). Both sources reference the "unjust steward's meditation" in
Luke 16:3, a reference which appears in other sources as well and which appears to
be the quintessential example of aporia: "What shall I do? for my lord taketh away
from me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed." (qtd. in Harmon). The
steward's aporia is represented by his indecision, feigned in this case, which results
from a particular dilemma.
The scriptural allusion certainly provides some contextualization, but it is not
representative of the concept's historical origins. In fact, one of the earliest
representations of aporia can be found in Plato's Socratic dialogue Meno. In the
midst of a discussion over the nature of virtue, Socrates requests one ofMeno's
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"attendants" or slaves and asks him a series of geometry challenges which ultimately
lead to the boy's admission of his own ignorance. As is typical of the method of

elenchus, the dialectical mode preferred by Socrates, the series of questions is
intended to be intellectually productive, a fact to which the following passage, which
begins with the slave-boy's confession of ignorance, bears significant testimony:

Boy
Well, on my word, Socrates, I for one do not know.
Socrates
There now, Meno, do you observe what progress he has already made in his
recollection? At first he did not know· what is the line that forms the figure of
eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he
knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of
no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not
knowing does not think he knows.
Meno
That is true.
Socrates
And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know?
Meno
I think that too is so.
Socrates
Now, by causing him to doubt and giving him the torpedo's shock, have we
done him any harm?
Meno
I think not.
Socrates
And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards
finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search
gladly, as lacking knowledge; whereas then he would have been only too
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ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any
number of times, that the double space must have a line of double the length
for its side.
Meno

It seems so.
Socrates

Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he
thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the
perplexity of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to
know?
Meno

I think not, Socrates.
Socrates

Then the torpedo's shock was of advantage to him?
Meno

I think so. (Meno 84a-c)

Throughout the passage, "aporein," and its various inflected forms, occur in
three distinct semantic manifestations, translated respectively as "difficulty," "to
doubt," and "perplexity." The act of being "perplexed," as experienced by the slave
boy, is discussed as well as the state of"perplexity." The Greek root allows for both
verb and noun inflections. But the various figurative and inflectional uses of the
morpheme, while they are indicative of the syntactic and semantic fluidity of the
term, are secondary to the passage's rhetorical significance. The epistemic
advantages of aporia, as set out by Plato's Socrates, are founded upon an awareness
of ignorance which is superior to the slave-boy's mistaken confidence in his own
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flawed intelligence. To state it more simply, he is better off realizing his ignorance
than persisting, unknowingly, in ignorance. Furthermore, the new knowledge is the
. cause of no detrimental effect but rather, provides the boy with a natural intellectual
curiosity, a philosophical impetus to remedy his deficit. Finally, Socrates makes
certain to reiterate that none of this would be possible without the "perplexity" or
aporia of the awareness of ignorance.
Plato's examination of the concept of aporia, and the various allusions and
definitions

oft~e

term which appear in handbooks and dictionaries, demonstrate a

tangible critical tradition on which to base investigations of poetic doubt and
difficulty. This tradition is further realized in the philosophical investigation of the
concept in Nicholas Rescher's Aporetics: Rational Deliberation in the Face of
Inconsistency (2009). As is evident in the title, Rescher is especially concerned with

the methods in which an aporia, or "apory," is intellectually processed and resolved.
In the Preface, Rescher identifies the work as an attempt to "synthesize and
systematize an aporetic procedure for dealing with information overload (of
'cognitive dissonance,' as it is sometimes called)" (ix). The text is also useful in that
it provides a more precise (although specialized) definition of the concept: "any
cognitive situation in which the threat of inconsistency confronts us" (1). Rescher
further introduces his specific study of aporetic by qualifying the term as "a group of
individually plausible but collectively incompatible theses," a designation he
illustrates with the following syllogism or "cluster of contentions":
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1. What the sight of our eyes tells us is to be believed.
2. Sight tells us the stick is bent.
3. What the touch of our hand tells us is to be believed.
4. Touch tells us the stick is straight. (2)

The aporia, or "apory" of this syllogism lies in the fact that, while each of these
assertions are individually conceivable, together, they are inconsistent or impossible.
Published in 2009, Rescher's study is ultimately indicative of the continuing
presence of scholarly examinations of the concept of aporia. It is part of a tradition
which looks back to Plato's work. However, in more recent literary criticism, this
tradition has generally been overlooked. In fact, scholars have .developed new critical
systems to deal with aporetic literature which make little or no reference to the
preexisting tradition of aporia. The most conspicuous instance of such oversight is
Dwight Eddins's "Darkness Audible: The Poem of Poetic Failure," which examines
"poetic failure" as it emerges in the metapoetic works of four major known poets:
Coleridge, Yeats, G.M. Hopkins, and Dylan Thomas. Eddins's examination of
Coleridge's poetic failure depends specifically on his recognition of the poet's
compositional processes as failed processes, in which the poet cannot connect or
synthesize the various and disparate subjects of his contemplation: "The dynamic of
imaginative synthesis is perverted into a dynamic of anti-synthesis that not only
deconstructs vision but enforces randomness and incoherence among its potential
components" (408). "Poetic failure," as a figure of inability or ineffability arising
from doubt or paradox, is inherently analogous to similar tropes of aporia. Indeed, it
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might even be pertinent to incorporate the conceptualization of poetic failure as a
distinct element in a broader critical classification of aporetic manifestations. To
further define the critical system in which this might take place, it is necessary to
introduce a scholar whose work on aporia is perhaps the most well known: French
deconstruc~ionist

Jacques Derrida.

In Aporias: Dying-Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth, " Derrida
employs the concept of aporia to discuss the paradoxical questions of mortality: "Is
my death possible? Can we understand this question? Can I, myself, pose it? Am I
allowed to talk about my death?" (21 ). The theorist systematically interrogates these
ontological questions, which arise from the essential impasse between the
word/concept "death" and its ",unassignable" meaning or "thingness" (22), by
utilizing a theoretical classification of the concept of aporia itself. Within this
classification system, Derrida identifies three possibilities of the aporetic modality:

A plural logic of the aporia thus takes shape .... In one case, the
nonpassage resembles an impermeability; it would stem from the
opaque existence of an uncrossable border: a door that does not open
or that only opens according to an unlocatable condition, according to
the inaccessible secret of some shibboleth.... In another case, the
nonpassage, the impasse or aporia, stems from the fact that there is no
limit. There is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross, no
opposition between two sides: the limit is too porous, permeable, and
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indeterminate.... Finally, the third type of aporia, the impossible, the
antinomy, or the contradiction, is a nonpassage because its elementary
milieu does not allow for something that could be called passage, step,
walk, gait, displacement, or replacement, a kinesis in general. There is
no more path.... The impasse itself would b.e impossible. (20-21)

These three possibilities of aporia- "impermeability," "limitless permeability," and
the "impossible"- demonstrate the concept's complex evolution from rhetorical
stratagem in Plato's Dialogues to philosophical/deconstructionist modus operandi.
Ultimately, such evolution is indicative of the critical opportunity provided by Plato
and Derrida, the foundation upon which the concept of aporia can be applied to
literature. Furthermore, a critical system built upon this multifaceted foundation
should possess the capability to engage and incorporate classifications such as poetic
failure, thereby consolidating theoretical approaches to create a more unified
theoretical framework. The various divergent systems of Platonic rhetoric and
Derridean philosophy further demonstrate the essential need for theoretical synthesis
of the complex and inexplicable nature of the study of aporetics. Ultimately, an
extended investigation of aporia is needed to reconcile and synthesize the differences
demonstrated by both Derrida's and Plato's treatment of the concept, as well as the
misappropriation and oversight made apparent by Eddins's use of the term "poetic
failure."
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However, such a task should also be combined with an elucidation of the
mode's immediate product. The aims of this work are dual, then, as I hope to both 1)
create a coherent definition of literary aporia which synthesizes various
manifestations and classifications of the concept; and 2) determine the consequences
of the aporetic mode in specific literary texts as well as its ultimate significance
within English and American poetic histories and traditions of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
The following investigations of aporetic function and situation rely on literary
analysis and observation of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Alfred Tennyson, and Wallace
Stevens. Chapter One includes a comprehensive realization of Coleridge's inability
to reconcile philosophical and aesthetic modes of thought in Biographia Literaria
(1817); and to demonstrate the effect of this inability and incoherence on Coleridge's
poetry, specifically three meta-poems which can be defined as containing elements of
aporia: "Dejection: An Ode" (1802), "Kubla Khan" (1816), and "The Eolian Harp"
(1796). Chapter Two, which moves directly into the Victorian period, consists of an
investigation of Tennyson's In Memoriam. The chapter examines instances of doubt
in Tennyson's major elegy which can be argued to be representative of a larger mode
of aporia that occur within four distinct elements of the text: 1) its multiple
expressions of ineffability, 2) its fragmentary composition 3) its elegiac genre, and 4)
its speaker's anxiety over the poem's reception. Such a mode becomes a central force
in the poem because it enables rather than disables the elegy's dialectical and
rhetorical elements to produce new systems of belief and knowledge. The third and
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final chapter shifts to the American Modernist period to examine a broad sampling of
Stevens' s poetry by focusing on a system of aporia which is comprised of various
modes of apophasis, ineffability, and agnosticism. Analysis and discussion of a
number ofStevens's poems demonstrate the productive and positive nature of
imagination and aporia in Stevens's poetics. The chapter ultimately narrows in scope
to investigate Stevens's major work "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" (1947).
The various aesthetic and philosophical disparities between these three poets
undoubtedly create three distinct poetic approaches to aporetic function and situation.
To account for these disparities, each chapter necessarily emerges within its own
unique form, as analysis, text, and theory require. Furthermore, the poets'
biographical and historical circumstances also influence textual manifestations of
aporia. In Coleridge and Tennyson, tropes of failure, doubt, and paradox often
emerge as a response to some personal trauma which can be linked to biographical
details in the writer's life. Stevens, in contrast, as a Modernist practitioner, often
depersonalizes and deliberately interrogates the limits and boundaries of the poetic
imagination. Accordingly, each chapter includes a biographical section to
contextualize the individual poet's aporetic intentions, or lack thereof. The respective
poetic texts in this study differ in significant ways, yet a comprehensive examination
of the total effect of the aporetic within the texts is not without a collective analytical
product. In particular, the comparison of the various modes and approaches to the
aporetic situation revealed by the three chapters demonstrates an inherent progression
from debilitating (in the poetic works of Coleridge), to consolatory (in Tennyson's In
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Memoriam), and finally, to productive (in Stevens's "Notes Toward a Supreme
Fiction). Furthermore, the three stages of this progression can be categorized by
Derrida's aporetic types. Coleridge's debilitation corresponds to the third type, the
"impossibility'' of"passage" or movement, which prohibits the imagination from
extending beyond the imaginer, as is succinctly demonstrated in the following lines
from "Dejection: An Ode," a poem of imaginative failure and despair:

It were a vain endeavor,
Though I should gaze forever
On that green light that lingers in the west:
I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within. (III, ll. 4-8)

The consolatory stage found in Tennyson's In Memoriam functions from
Derrida's first type, the "impermeability" of an "uncrossable border," specifically the
uncrossable border between the speaker and his departed friend, Arthur Hallam, the
subject of Tennyson's elegy. Unlike Coleridge, Tennyson's speaker does not lament
the failure of the imagination. He dwells in the realm of possibility rather than
impossibility. And yet, an awareness, a connection with, Hallam is largely
inaccessible; a spiritual reunion is only achievable through an "inaccessible secret of
some shibboleth," in Tennyson's case, the shibboleth of Christian faith:
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We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see
And yet we trust it comes from thee,
A beam in darkness: let it grow. (Prologue, IL 21-24)

Finally, Stevens's productive stage directly corresponds with Derrida's
second aporetic type: the limitless, "too porous (and] permeable," "indeterminate." In
"The Plain Sense of Things" (1952), Stevens writes "Yet the absence of the
imagination had I Itself to be imagined." (II. 13-14). The inherent impasse of these
lines is not, as in Tennyson, restricted by faith, or, as in Coleridge, by the impassable
distance between subject and object. Rather, Stevens's ideation is blocked only by
the profundity of limitlessness. It is a gesture toward the infinite capabilities of the
imagination which not only characterizes American modernism, but the culmination
of aporetic opportunity as well.
As is evident, this study depends heavily on Derrida's classification of the
types of aporia. The following examinations, are not, however, wholly bound to a
deconstructionist or Derridean approach. It's important to note that Derrida's
assertions concerning aporetic types, indeed the entire work in which those assertions
appear, are motivated by philosophy rather than literary criticism or literary history.
Derrida's conceptualizations are a starting point for this study, and a method to
demonstrate the progression of aporetic function in literary history. Ultimately, the
identification of such progression allows the literary critic a glimpse, not only into
the evolution of poetry from the Romantic to Modernist periods, but into the history
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of intellect itself, of philosophy, rhetoric and metaphysics, into the methods humans
employ to cope with the unknown, the puzzling, and the doubtful.
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Chapter One

The Mad Lutanist:
Coleridge's Aesthetic Incoherence and Debilitating Aporia

While he gained some notoriety in his old age, the majority of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge's life was extremely difficult. We need not look beyond the poet's most
well-documented troubles, his reluctant and unhappy marriage to Sarah Fricker, his
unrequited love for Wordsworth's sister-in-law Sara Hutchinson, and his opium
addiction and poverty, to find an abundance of material to support such a claim.
Certainly, critics have long employed biographical material to interpretations of
Coleridge's work; however, a new line of interpretation might be opened by
employing biographical information to contextualize functions of aporia which
appear not only in the writer's poetry, but his prose as well. Accordingly, the
following study begins with a brief discussion of Coleridge's major prose work,
Biographia Literaria ( 1817). Examinations of this work reveal two important
properties of Coleridge's writing. First, the contradicting declarations of philosophy,

art, imagination and composition (and Coleridge's inability to reconcile such
contradictions) within Biographia are representative of the essential incoherence of
the poet's aesthetic principles. Secondly, analysis of this incoherence allows for the
discovery of instances of aporia in Biographia while also providing a possible source
or origin for the aporetic situations which arise in three of Coleridge's "conversation
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poems." A careful analysis of these poems, "The Eolian Harp" (1796), "Dejection:
An Ode" (1802), and "Kubla Khan" (1816), reveal their specific aporetic functions

and the correspondence of these functions to Derrida's third aporetic type, "the
impossible, the antinomy, or the contradiction" (Aporias 21). Further analysis of
these poems will also reveal and define the debilitating nature of Coleridgean aporia,
a critical ambition of this study which necessitates the inclusion of biographical
detail into discussions of all three poems. Finally, analysis of Coleridge's "Dejection:
An Ode" will also include discussions of Dwight Eddins's "poetic failure" genre and

of the possibility that this critical system might be incorporated into the larger
classification of the debilitating aporetic mode.
Evidence of the aesthetic incoherence of Biographia Literaria emerges in two
arenas of evaluative anxiety. First, Coleridge's attempts to assess his own literary
abilities reveal a system of contradiction in which the author fails to reconcile
opposing assertions of self-worth and self-deprecation. Anxieties stemming from
such a failure are inherently connected to and further exacerbated by the poet's
apprehensions concerning the validity and significance of his work, or lack thereof,
apprehensions which are identified by critic David Vallins in a study of competing
modalities of idealism and empiricism. The second evaluative anxiety, the
apprehension of critical reception, becomes apparent in investigations of a modality
of apology which surfaces in the work. Coleridge's insistent need to defend his work
against contemporary critical accusations, as well as the work of friend Robert
Southey, reveal the poet's intense anxieties concerning the critical reception of his

17

poetry and prose. Anxieties of ability, literary product, and critical reception
influence the work's apparent aesthetic incoherence, but Biographia is also a
philosophical treatise. A study by Roy Ayon, which deals with contradicting
influences of Schelling and Hegel within the work, further reveals the work's specific
philosophical inconsistencies. The cumulative product of each of these
manifestations of incoherence reveals the fundamental aporia of Coleridge's prose, a
state of "nonpassage" in which the author cannot move forward, reconcile, or
overcome contradicting philosophical and aesthetic stances.
Before any discussion of these specific instances of incoherence, it is first
pertinent to consider the general claim: why does this study insist on the mystifying
deconstructionist label incoherent, and how have other scholars interpreted
Biographia? Jerome McGann provides a partial answer to these questions as he
examines the state of scholarly research surrounding the controversial work and
attempts to expound a "consensus" among such research. The result ofMcGann's
synthetic efforts demonstrates a critical consensus which is predominantly
characterized by an agreement of the incoherence of Biographia. No critic has yet
resolved the tension between Coleridge's "critique of the empirical tradition and of
materialism, and his correlative defense ofldealist positions" (742). The poet's
political outlook is both "independent and conservative" (742). None of the poet's
representations of his own convictions, be they political, aesthetic or philosophical,
can be viewed "objectively" without reference and deference to the poet's own
subjectivity. (Coleridge's various pronouncements cannot be understood outside the
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context of other pronouncements.) Finally, the "literary criticism" of Biographia is
the ultimate accomplishment of the work (742). Three out of the four items of
"consensus," (excluding the final, immediately previous pronouncement) are
effectively connected only in their agreement of Coleridge's many contradictions.
Furthermore, the consensus of incoherence which is ultimately discovered by
McGann remains unresolved as McGann chooses to limit his critical focus to the
element of literary criticism in Biographia for the remainder of the study. McGann's
ultimate findings, then, apply only to this element. This is not to say McGann's
conclusions are irrelevant. Although he fails to resolve the various contradictions of
the text, his poststructuralist interpretation of Coleridge's aesthetic process is
illuminating: "Coleridge's theory of poetry sees it as a continuous play of signifiers
and signifieds, and its object is to provide, in the traces left by this play, glimpses of
the ordering process which is the ground for the play" (750). However, such an
aesthetic interpretation is only useful as a means to provide a cohesive vision of
Biographia, a vision which is inherently limited, in McGann's own assessment, to
issues of literary criticism. An appropriate response to McGann's interpretation
requires not only an examination of the work's incoherent vision in modes both
aesthetic and philosophical, but also an application of those incoherencies to at least
a portion of Coleridge's poetry. Herein lies further critical impetus to examine
Biographia as an essentially incoherent text: such examinations not only reveal the
aporetic mode within the work, they also uncover possible sources of origin for the
aporia found within his poetry.
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A starting point for examinations of incoherence in Biographia may be found
in a in a brief passage from the second chapter. This single statement not only serves
as a representative paradigm for the inconsistencies of Biographia, it also
demonstrates certain anxieties of literary ability which emerge within the work:

Besides, though it may be paradoxical to assert, that a man can know
one thing and believe the opposite, yet assuredly, a vain person may
have so habitually indulged the wish, and persevered in the attempt to
appear, what he is not, as to become himself one of his own
proselytes. (Halmi 395)

In the discussion following this declaration, Coleridge attempts to repudiate the
notion of"irritability" as an indicator of poetic genius (395). On a local level, the
contentions of this passage seek to ·affirm the failure of the writer to acknowledge or
accurately perceive his own poetic ability. On a broader interpretative level, however,
the statement is indicative of a writer who is incredibly and inherently conflicted.
Coleridge's admission to this conflict is represented almost immediately in his
confession, "though it may be paradoxical to assert." The passage is further
characterized by an implicit difference between competing epistemological modalities
of knowledge and belief, clausal duality, and an exhaustive syntax leading to an
essential inchoateness. Coleridge's claim concerning a human's ability to "know one
\thing and believe the opposite" not only implicates those he considered to be
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poetasters, it implicates himself as well. Coleridge's explicit knowledge and
acknowledgement of "one thing" and "the opposite" betrays his own experience with
an epistemological system of duplicity in which the poet both doubts and affirms his
creative agency. Furthermore, this self-implication is manifested in the shifting
progression of nouns and pronouns which begin as general and inclusive but evolve
to become more specific. Such evolution reveals a process of descending stages, in
which the sentence progresses from a telescopic representationof everyman to a
personal and microscopic self-reference: "a man," "a vain person," "he," "himself."
Note also the shift from the nominative case to the accusative. The clausal duality of
the passage parallels this duplicity from the initial "Besides," an adverb which both
refers back to a previous statement and initiates a system of duality in which
Coleridge walks a tightrope between contradictory accusations of subject and object,
the grammatical manifestations of the symbolic other and the symbolic self. This
system is most immediately identifiable in the poet's diction of function: the initial
adverb "besides," the following subordinating conjunction "though," and the
coordinating conjunction and adverb "yet assuredly," which betrays not only the
poet's aporia, but his unsuccessful attempt to assuage that aporia. This attitude of
reassurance is also revealed in the exhaustive syntax of the sentence which contains
no less than six relative clauses and two subordinating clauses. The consequence of
such clause accumulation is a declaration which is at once incoherent and desperate,
as Coleridge makes multiple (failed) attempts to narrow the semantic
(and aesthetic) gap.
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The analysis of this passage alone provides significant evidence for the
aesthetic incoherence and resulting aporia of Biographia; however, current critical
research of these issues provide further analysis and support. Especially pertinent
here is David Vall ins's identification of the poet's apprehensions concerning artistic
motivation and the value of his literary product, apprehensions which are inherently
linked to the anxieties concerning his poetic ability discussed previously.
Acknowledging the philosophical attention Coleridge paid to "non-rational" modes
of thought, Vallins identifies the poet's anxiety concerning these modes and the
opposing and grounded rational process of the mind. Furthermore, Vallins asserts
that Coleridge struggled to create a reasonable and meaningful order of his feelings
which might be "insightful" or "delusive" (15 8). This struggle ultimately results in
Coleridge's adoption of"idealist" over "empiricist" modes of thought. However, the
poet is unable to resolve the anxiety produced by the contemplation of his literary
endeavors, which cause an apprehension "about the motivation of his work, both in a
moral sense and in terms of its implications for the validity of his ideas" (179).
Vallins' s identification of competing "idealist" and "empiricist" modes in Biographia
is especially applicable to Coleridge's assertion "that a man can know one thing and
believe the opposite;" however, Coleridge fails to demonstrate, as Vallins claims, a
preference for "idealist" modes of belief within the surrounding passage. Vallins's
ultimate interpretation of Biographia as an exhibition of unresolved compositionalcreative anxiety can be further supported in an examination of the following passage
which immediately precedes Coleridge's assertions of belief and knowledge:
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In whatever country literature is widely diffused, there will be many
who mistake an intense desire to possess the reputation of poetic
genius, for the actual powers, and original tendencies which constitute
it. But men, whose dearest wishes are fixed on subjects wholly out of
their power, become in all cases more or less impatient and prone to
anger. (395)

Vallins's recognition of anxieties of artistic motivation and validity are especially
apparent in these two sentences. Coleridge's desire to produce specific demarcations
of poetic ability or "genius," his desire to clearly delineate and separate poet from
poetaster is indicative of a further support for the anxiety of ability in which the poet
implicitly betrays apprehensions surrounding his own creative agency. Furthermore,
Coleridge's experience and knowledge of the "impatience" and "anger" resulting
from inability or impotence betrays his own lack of artistic confidence.
Along with aesthetic anxieties of ability, artistic motivation, and the validity of his
literary product, Coleridge also suffers from a second evaluative anxiety which
surfaces in a modality of apology (defense) within Biographia- specifically,
Coleridge's insistent need to defend his work against critical accusations.
Interestingly, Coleridge also defends the work of poet Robert Southey. The
apologetic mode reveals further evidence of Coleridge's conflicted evaluative sense
of ability and product as it uncovers his specific and intense apprehension of critical
reception. In Chapter Three, Coleridge considers the various motivations for the
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abuse of various contemporary critics, and focusing on the most likely ("noscitur a
socio"), initiates a comprehensive defense of Robert Southey. Coleridge's need to
defend and explain the motives of his critics is indicative of an anxiety of critical
reception, an anxiety which is further compounded in the evasive transference of an
apology for his own work to an apology of Southey's. Coleridge acknowledges such
a transference, stating, "This, however, transfers, rather than removes, the difficulty"
but nevertheless plunges into an exhaustive examination of Southey's mistreatment
(404).
The anxieties of ability, motivation, literary product and critical reception
discussed above demonstrate the text's aesthetic incoherence; however, Biographia
is not solely concerned with aesthetics, since it is a philosophical manifesto as well, a
manifesto characterized by numerous contradictions and incoherencies. McGann' s
acknowledgment of the failure of critical research to interpret a mode or method
which resolves these inconsistencies has undoubtedly prompted studies which define
the work's epistemological and philosophical systems as fundamentally irresolvable.
Critic Roy Ayon's investigation of the poet's "complex and ambivalent attitude
towards foundationalist intuitionism" (280) is especially pertinent. After a discussion
of the various disparities and convergences of Schelling and Hegel, Ayon asserts that
Coleridge's letters and marginalia reveal his philosophical stance to be located
between the two thinkers. Furthermore, this conflicted stance demonstrates a specific
paradox of the "self-undermining text" of Biographia, a paradox in which Coleridge
expresses "skepticism" concerning intuition while actively employing and
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"advancing" the theory (280). Ayon's identification of the "self-undermining" dual
processes of uncertainty and promotion of philosophical systems parallel the
aesthetic tensions of the text discussed previously in which the poet both doubts and
affirms his literary ability. Furthermore, Ayon's acknowledgement of the text's
essential philosophical paradox allows the critic to identify the essential aesthetic
paradox as well. Coleridge's employment of literary ability to confess to literary
inability, his apprehensions concerning the value of his literary product within a
literary product, and his anxieties of critical reception which anticipate that reception,
all are equally paradoxical. Furthermore, such paradoxes are ultimately
representative of the general aporia which surfaces in Coleridge's prose as he
repeatedly and consistently traps himself between contradicting assertions of anxiety
and ability. These assertions allow no movement, progression or escape precisely
because no reconciliation is possible between their essentially opposing
circumstances.
Nicholas Rescher' s definition of an "apory", as a "group of individually
plausible but collectively incompatible theses" (1 ), provides further elucidation. For
example, by itself, Coleridge's affirmation of creative agency is "plausible."
However, the addition of the poet's doubt of his abilities to this "thesis" creates a
syllogism which is collectively inconsistent. No conclusion can be made to resolve
the separate theses because they contradict each other. The inherent aporia which
arises from such duality in Biographia may also be viewed as a possible source of
origin for certain aporetic functions which emerge in "The Eolian Harp," "Dejection:
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An Ode," and "Kubla Khan." All three poems commit similar logical errors of

duality as their speakers (metapoetically) acknowledge the failure of the poems'
linguistic systems while employing such systems to acknowledge that failure.
Furthermore, this process results in a mode of abandonment in all three poems. In
"The Eolian Harp," for instance, contradicting modes of imagination and religion
result in the abandonment of a specific poetic system within the poem. In "Dejection:
An Ode," the speaker's inability to relieve personal moments of doubt and despair

leads him to abandon concern for himself and focus on concern for another, the
"Lady" whom he apostrophizes throughout the poem, and whom many critics have
identified as Sara Hutchinson. In "Kubla Khan," the speaker abandons the entire
poetic system. This similarity of mode certainly connects discussions of the poems'
aporetic functions. But "The Eolian Harp" and "Dejection: An Ode," are more
explicitly linked by their shared concern with Coleridge's difficult romantic
experiences, a fact which determines the order of subsequent discussion and also
necessitates a brief biographical discussion.
In a notebook entry written when he was living with the Wordsworths
(William and sister Dorothy) and Sara Hutchinson, (1808-1809), Coleridge writes:

Unhappy I!-I have loved many more than ever I loved myself, & one
beyond myself, & beyond all things, & all persons-but never, never
have I met with any Being who did not love many better than they
loved me-Several women that would have married me because no
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one whom they better loved, was in their power; but never anyone,
who would have married me, because they loved me better than any
one .... In the Anger of Agony I could almost bid [Hutchinson] look
at herself, & into herself, & then ask whether she beloved constantly
has a right to compare others with me, & love them better because
they are more vigorous, or more this thing or the other-Love
more!-0 blasphemy! (Halmi 597-598)

On a surface level, the notebook entry is indicative of a sentimental and introspective
nature, one in which self-indulgence is particularly prominent. Coleridge, of course,
has foreseen this accusation, and argues that his feelings reveal, instead, the
"constancy of nature," a characteristic inherent in the "least selfish" individuals
(597). Yet the immediate contradiction of this short passage rests in the absence of
any mention of Coleridge's wife, Sarah Fricker, whom he married in 1795. Coleridge
laments the sad fact that no woman would choose him above others to marry. Yet the
poet's choice of Fricker was, ironically, motivated by practical purposes: Coleridge's
desire to establish a utopian community, Pantisocracy, with Robert Southey, who,
because he was married to her sister, encouraged Coleridge to wed Sarah Fricker.
If "The Eolian Harp" (1795) is any indication, this union began happily even

if it eventually resulted in the despondent attitudes expressed above. The poem,
which was first published as "Effusion XXXV," and which is addressed to Sarah
Fricker, was written immediately before the two were married and is set at Clevedon,
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Somersetshire. It begins with descriptions of the peace the speaker feels as he takes
joy in his company, Sarah Fricker, and the atmosphere of the evening. The sights,
smells and sounds of dusk are noticed and appreciated, and the speaker's senses are
especially tuned to manifestations of nature: the "white-flower'd Jasmin," "the
broad-leav'd Myrtle," "the clouds, that late were rich with light," "the star of eve" (II.
4, 6, 7). Before long, the speaker notices "that simplest Lute," the Eolian harp, to
which he pays considerable attention, assessing the nature of its music, and praising
its strange and melodic beauty.
The images associated with the lute's music are particularly outlandish, at
odds with a Christian aesthetic: "Such a soft floating witchery of sound I As twilight
Elfins make ... like birds of Paradise I ... hov'ring on untam'd wing" (II. 20-21, 2425). Subsequently, these associations lead the speaker to a comparison of the wind
which plays the lute to the barrage of idea and thought which floats through the
imagination:

And many idle phantasies,
Traverse my indolent and passive brain
As wild and various, as the random gales
That swell or flutter on this subject lute! (II. 32-35)

This analogy, in turn, causes the speaker to hypothesize about the human capability
to imagine independently:
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And what if all animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely fram'd,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps,
Plastic and vast, one intellectual Breeze. (JI. 36-39)

Comparing human thought processes to the passive, pantheistic musical
enactment of the Eolian harp, the speaker asserts the Jack of self-will and control, the
Jack of autonomy, in human individuals. Instead, "animated nature" is controlled by
the "intellectual Breeze," which is "At once the soul of each, and God of all" (II. 36,
39-40). Considering this ideation from his partner Sarah's perspective, however, the
speaker quickly abandons such a hypothesis as inherently blasphemous:

But thy more serious eye as mild reproof
Darts, 0 beloved Woman! nor such thoughts
Dim and unhallow' d doest thou not reject,
and biddest me walk humbly with my God. (JI. 41-44)

The following final lines of the poem are devoted to the speaker's affirmation of his
Christian faith.
The aporetic function of this poem occurs at a distinct moment: specifically,
as the speaker acknowledges the failure of both imaginative and rational processes to
arrive at any truth concerning human autonomy. Such a moment is characterized
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instead, by the speaker's complete abandonment of the hypothesis which his
observations of nature and the lute have led him to. Instead of following the
imaginative line which might be created from his assertions on the "one intellectual
breeze ... the soul of each, and God of all," the speaker deems such reasoning as
inherently impossible and irreconcilable with Christian theology. The implicit duality
constructed by the speaker which manifests in contradicting modalities of human
imagination on one pole and moral considerations on the other, like Coleridge's
opposing aesthetic assertions in Biographia, further characterize the poem's aporia.
Such a duality can only be reconciled by the abandonment of one of the contradicting
theses. The speaker, of course, chooses to abandon imaginative agency.
Such a process, it might be argued, parallels Derrida's identification of the
third aporetic type which is a "nonpassage because its elementary milieu does not
allow for something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait, displacement, or
replacement, a kinesis in general. There is no more path .... The impasse itself
would be impossible." (21). The speaker's question is not "how" to reach the
conclusion of his many blasphemous assertions because there is no conclusion, no
way through to an epistemological destination which does not exist. The aporia, the
puzzle which the speaker sets up for himself, is one which has no possible answer
because it is beyond the grasp of human mental faculty and can only be answered by
a superhuman entity, in Coleridge's case, the Christian God. Religion then, becomes
a manifestation of the unknown; it allows the speaker some reconciliation by
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permitting him to abandon his imaginative dilemma, a process which is illustrated in
four lines from the earlier version of the poem, "Effusion XXXV":

For never guiltless may I speak of Him,
Th' INCOMPREHENSIBLE! Save when with awe
I praise him, and with Faith that inly feels;
Who with his saving mercies healed me.... (11. 50-53)

Like "The Eolian Harp," "Dejection: An Ode" is also addressed to a female, a
"Lady" which many critics have argued might be Wordsworth's sister-in-law, Sara
Hutchinson. Unlike "Dejection," the poem's system of aporia is much more complex.
To attend to this complexity, it's first necessary to realize the poem's various
aporetic modes. In particular, the poem's aporetic quality depends upon five acts
performed by its speaker: I) the admission that poetic language fails to provide
emotional or spiritual catharsis, 2) the paradoxical acknowledgment of the failure of
language within a system of language, 3) the generation of an awareness of the
unbridgeable difference between perceived and perceiver, signified and signifier, 4)
the apprehension that observations of external realities cannot alter, alleviate or
modify internal states, and 5) the assertion that observations of external realities
allow no obtainable truth concerning those realities, such observations are only
capable of mirroring the processes of observation. Furthermore, the nature of such
acts causes them to appear within instances of metapoesis, in which the speaker
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transcends the immediate narrative of the text to comment on compositional process
or aesthetic circumstance.
The poem begins with the speaker's perception of the weather conditions and
his hope for a storm that "might startle this dull pain, and make it move and live" (I.
20). Coleridge's use of the subjunctive signifier "might" in the line and its parallel in
the line immediately previous initiate the poem's hypothetical and aporetic mode. In
the second stanza, the speaker identifies the particular melancholy he experiences as:

A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,
A stifled drowsy, unimpassion'd grief,
Which finds no natural outlet, no relief,
In word, or sigh, or tear- (IL 21-24)

It is an extraordinary grief especially because it is explicitly irresolvable. The
speaker's acknowledgement that the "word" cannot offer "outlet" or "relief' creates
the inherent metapoetic paradox of the ode which is written to alleviate emotional
trauma yet admits to the impossibility of such an alleviation, a paradox which is
immediately and intrinsically related to the "self-undermining" processes
demonstrated by Coleridge's own assertion "that a man can know one thing and
believe the opposite" (BL 395). In the remainder of the stanza, the speaker briefly
introduces the "Lady" whom he apostrophizes throughout the ode but turns quickly
to descriptions of the act and processes of an instance of observation-the object
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being the "western sky" and the moon and stars which fill it: "And still I gaze---and
with how blank an eye!" (I. 30); "I see them all so excellently fair, I I see, not feel
how beautiful they are" (II. 37-38). The distinction between visual observation and
emotional perception made in the final line is indicative of Coleridge's attempts to
identify the essential separateness of the external sphere and the impossibility of an
authentic perception of this sphere by the seer, who may observe beauty but fails to
understand it. In the third stanza, the speaker again confesses to feelings morose and
melancholic while expounding on internal and external difference: "I may not hope
from outward forms to win I The passion and the life, whose fountains are within" (II.

45-46). For the speaker of"Dejection," observations of outward forms cannot
alleviate internal states of emotional anxiety. In stanza four, the speaker again
apostrophizes the "Lady" and asserts that the only obtainable epistemological
systems are those which come from within, "O Lady! we receive but what we give, I
and in our life alone does nature live" (II. 47-48). Nothing may be obtained from
observations of the external object but the processes of this observation. This is
further expounded as the speaker realizes that even the realization of observational
procedure is not certain-but dependent upon the perceiver's emotional state:

Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloudWe in ourselves rejoice!
And thence flows all that charms or ear or sight,
All melodies the echoes of that voice,
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All colours a suffusion from that light. (II. 71-75)

In stanza six, the speaker reminisces on his happy past which enabled him a
poetic ability and laments his current emotional state which "suspends what nature
gave me at my birth, I My shaping spirit oflmagination" (II. 85-86). Such
contemplations motivate the speaker to shift his gaze from inward to outward in the
seventh stanza, as he attempts to provide a description of the wind "which long has
rav' d unnotic' d" (I. 97). This shift demonstrates the paradox of the poem yet again as
Coleridge maintains the futility of external observation as he practices such
observation. Furthermore, because of such a paradoxical and dual mode, it must be
assumed that Coleridge's textual representations of"wind" represent nothing in the
external sphere. Instead, these representations betray their compositional processes.
His personification of wind, therefore, must also be viewed as a personification of his
own identity. Coleridge himself is the "Mad Lutanist," the "Actor, perfect in all
tragic sounds," the "Mighty Poet, [even] to frenzy bold!" (II. 104, 108, 109).
In the final stanza, the speaker again returns to concerns for his "lady," and
wishes her joy and sleep, two accommodations which he does not allow himself.
Ultimately, the speaker's sadness is irresolvable and unalleviated. Whether or not the
woman is Sara Hutchinson, Coleridge's unrequited Jove, is subject to debate.
However, what is significant is the tension created by her resolved state and the
speaker's unalleviated sadness, a tension which remains unmitigated and, it might be
assumed, unbearable. Critic Dwight Eddins comes to a similar conclusion as he
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asserts that Coleridge's final apostrophe to the "Lady" represents a hypothetical
allusion which provides no relief for what he calls the "poetic failure" of the poem.
However, Eddins's analysis departs from my own in another significant way. Eddins
recognizes a conflux of failure in the "metapoem that is at once a lament for vision's
loss and a prayer for its return" (409). The latter aspect emerges as the poem's central
redemptive (aesthetic) quality. This redemption is symbolized in the poem as the
approaching storm, which characterizes the possibility of the re-attainment of voice
and vision. A similar interpretation is made by Thomas M. Greene. Employing one
of Coleridge's many notebook fragments as an access point to the body of the poet's
work, Greene identifies the dominant symbol of "privation" within this fragment and
asserts that "the suggestion that all imaginative writing derives from a certain
experience of privation needs to be considered seriously" (908). Greene further
contends that Coleridge's creative confrontation of privation is redemptive, even in a
poem of negative capability such as "Dejection: An Ode," which Greene identifies as
Coleridge's discovery of the "metaphoric generativity of the storm" (927). What both
of these critics fail to consider is that the metaphor of the storm is fully realized. The
transference of tenor and vehicle occurs and is finalized within the speaker's
personification of himself (discussed previously) as the "Mad Lutanist," the "Actor,
perfect in all tragic sounds," the "Mighty Poet, [even] to frenzy bold!" (II. 104, 108,
109). Coleridge equates the tenor of the metaphor, the storm, "Thou Wind, that
rav'st" to the vehicle of the "Mad Lutanist," "who in this month of show' rs, I of dark
brown gardens, and of peeping flow'rs, I Mak' st Devils' yule, with worse than
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wint'ry song" (II. 99, 104-106). To identify the possibility of aesthetic redemption
within the storm metaphor is to neglect the narrative of the poem. This transference,
(this possible redemption), has already occurred in the poem and has already failed.
In Coleridge's words, "This, however, transfers, rather than removes, the difficulty"
(BL 404). The identification of failed transference also connects the aporetic mode of

the poem to Derrida's third aporetic type. The storm is the "elementary milieu
[which] does not allow for something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait,
displacement, or replacement, a kinesis in general" (21 ). "There is no more path"
within the narrative system of the poem, precisely because the speaker himself
embodies the essential separation between self and other, poet and external object, a
separation which has already been proven to be impassable. The speaker's position as
both subject (tenor) and object (vehicle) prohibits any possibility of metaphoric
transcendence beyond the self, a situation which is further illustrated by the speaker's
shift to thoughts of sleep and his "Dear Lady" in the final stanza. Like the
impossibility of metaphoric transcendence, for the speaker, sleep is also impossible:
"'Tis midnight, but small thoughts have I of sleep" (I. 126). This realization, in tum,
leads the speaker to abandon concern for himself, and instead focus on the more
possible wishes ofrest, healing, and happiness for the "Lady:" "Visit her, gentle
Sleep! With wings of healing .... Joy lift her spirit, Joy attune her voice" (II. 128,
134).
Eddins' s identification of "Dejection: An Ode" as a "poem of poetic failure"
complicates my own assertion of the poem's "aporetic" qualities. What is the major
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difference, we may ask, between these two critical approaches, and their respective
nomenclature? Eddins's study "Darkness Audible: The Poem of Poetic Failure"
provides a partial answer. The study examines "the poem of poetic failure" as it
emerges in the metapoetic works of four major known poets: Coleridge, Yeats, G.M.
Hopkins, and Dylan Thomas. However, Eddins's emphasis on metapoetics, as
exhaustive and informative as it is, leaves little room for a thorough discussion of the
concrete and specific terms of poetic failure. Such an omission is ultimately
indicative of a larger problem: the lack of a thorough and systematic critical system
in which to examine instances of poetic doubt, creative failure, ineffability, and the
many other manifestations which emerge when poetic systems malfunction or break
down. Examining the concept of aporia, in all its dimensions, however, provides a
solution. "Poetic failure," as it is expounded by Eddins, is inherently analogous to the
specific functions of aporia which emerge in Coleridge's work. Discussion of a final
poem by Coleridge, "Kubla Khan," further identifies these functions and makes a
final critical aim of this study possible: specifically, the identification of the
debilitating mode of Coleridgean aporia, a mode which parallels Eddins's negative
nomenclature.

Like "The Eolian Harp" and "Dejection: An Ode," a discussion of "Kubla
Khan" also benefits from a brief biographical introduction. The poem's preface, in
which the speaker explicitly acknowledges the work as a consequence of "a profound
sleep" caused by the "effects" of "an anodyne," specifically necessitates details
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concerning Coleridge's opium use and addiction. Such addiction was undoubtedly
the most severely devastating difficulty suffered by the poet. A notebook entry from
1804, written aboard a ship bound for Malta, describes the excruciating constipation
pain, a common side effect of opiate abuse and withdrawal:

the Obscure, or the disgustful-the dull, quasi-finger pressure on the
liver, the endless Flatulence, the frightful constipation when the dead
Filth impales the lower Gut-to weep & sweat & moan & scream for
the parturience of an excrement with such pangs & such convulsions
as a woman with an Infant heir oflmmortality I for Sleep a
pandemonium of all the shames & miseries of the past Life from early
childhood all huddled together, & bronzed with stormy Light of
Terror & Self-torture I 0 this is hard, hard, hard!-0 dear God, give
me strength of Soul to make one trial- (Halmi 60 I)

While critics have certainly made use of such biographical material to interpret this
complex poem, it does little to provide a critical answer to the ongoing argument
concerning the poem's fragmented or whole (finished) state which is complicated by
the work's dual composition: (it contains both preface and actual poetic text). Such
duality, which again mirrors the incoherent duality which manifests in Coleridge's
prose, is representative of a fundamental system of opposition in which to locate the
text's main aporetic functions: anxieties of literary value within a literary product
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(the poem and its preface), prohibition of external observation which leads to the
paradoxical failure (and abandonment) of a poetic system within a poetic text, and an
awareness of the unbridgeable difference between perceived and perceiver, signified
and signifier.
In the Preface to the poem, Coleridge initiates anxieties of literary value by
immediately confessing the work's Jack of"poetic merits." This acknowledgement is
compounded by the speaker's admission of the unorthodox methods of inspiration in
the preface:
In consequence of a slight indisposition, an anodyne had been
prescribed, from the effects of which he fell asleep in his chair. ...
The author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at
least of the external senses, during which time he has the most vivid
confidence, that he could not have composed Jess than from two to
three hundred lines .... (180-181)

Coleridge's distinction between the sleep of internal and "external senses" is
particularly significant to our study as he claims to have written the fragment without
external capabilities. Such an assertion allows for the identification of a progression
from the speaker's lament of the futility of external observation in "Dejection" to the
outright prohibition of such processes in "Kubla Khan." Furthermore, the conditions
of the poem's only possible source as "internal" activities ofa "profound sleep" are
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indicative of its unfinished and abandoned state. Interrupted in the recording
processes, the speaker:

found to his no small surprise and mortification, that though he
retained some vague and dim recollection of the general purpose of
the vision, yet, with the exception of some eight or ten scattered lines
and images, all the rest had passed away like the images on the
surface of a stream in to which a stone has been cast, but, alas!
without the after restoration of the latter. (181)

The impossible premise of the poem, then, relies specifically on its method of
composition. "Kubla Khan" is an abandoned work precisely because it cannot be
accessed by the speaker. Its "elementary milieu," the tranquilizing of "external
senses" and "profound sleep" which is accessed through an experience with the
effects of opium cannot be repeated in an exact enough manner to complete the
compositional process. The poem's "impasse itself[is] impossible" (Derrida)
because its author cannot return to his source of composition.
But the compositional methods of "Kubla Khan" also highlight another
aporetic function within the poem: the speaker's intense awareness of subject I object
difference which culminates in an emotional attitude of fear. Support for this claim is
provided by David Hogsette whose interpretation of the poem reveals an aporetic
situation in which the "ideal (pro)creative and redemptive imagination lies beyond
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the grasp of the mortal poet, remaining an external and unobtainable other."
Hogsette's analysis relies on the incorporation of the poem's preface into the
"performance context" of the poem itself. Hogsette asserts that the aporia of "Kub la
Khan" reflects Coleridge's assessment of his own lack of poetic agency. To make
such an assertion, he emphasizes the passive compositional process (in part due to
the inspirational effect of the opium ingested by the poet) in which the "author figure
clearly rejects the faculties of the active primary and secondary imaginations in favor
of an unconscious, passive process that is antithetical to Coleridge's ideal poetic
process." Hogsette cites the following passage as evidence of the fear produced by
such a process:

And all who heard should see them there,
And all should cry, Beware! Beware!
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!
Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread,
For he on honeydew had fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise. (IL 48-54)

Hogsette's interpretation of this passage is certainly valid. The inhabitants' anxiety
concerning this figure is indicative of Coleridge's own anxiety of ability. Such
anxiety is further manifested in the speaker's "vision" of "a damsel with a dulcimer"
which is detached from the preceding narrative. This vision is inherently opposed to
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the poem's beginnings in which the speaker describes Kubla Khan's edict to
construct the Eden-like "pleasure-dome" and its gardens, the appearance of the
"sacred river," and "the ancestral voices prophesying war" (II. 2, 8, 30). This
opposition is most evident in the shift which occurs at the beginning of descriptions
of this vision, in which the first person "I" first appears in the poem:

A damsel with a dulcimer
In a vision once I saw:
It was an Abyssian maid
And on her dulcimer she play'd,
Singing of Mount Abora.
Could I revive within me
Her symphony and song,
To such a deep delight would 'twoud win me,
That with music loud and long,
I would build that dome in air.... (11. 37-46)

Along with the first person "I," this passage also reveals a shift of mood in the
poem-from indicative to subjunctive. The subjunctive is most notably apparent in
the hypothetical "could" and "would" which initiates a mode of doubt or
impossibility. Moreover, this mode of impossibility also reveals further anxieties of
creative ability as the speaker confesses his inability to "revive within [him]" the

I
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damsel's "symphony and song" (II. 42, 43). Finally, the passage is also representative
of the failure of a compositional mode which attempts to operate from only internal
modalities, without the "external senses." It is, after all, a "vision" which the speaker
cannot "revive" and all of the visions of "Kub la Khan" are ultimately ephemeral.
Coleridge's "passive compositional processes," as identified by Hogsette, fail as
poetic experiments because Coleridge can never access the entirety of his visions.
The implications of such failed experiments are dire. Not only does Coleridge fail to
transcend the internal through observations of the external in "Dejection," he fails to
produce a complete and functional poem of strictly internal processes in "Kubla
Khan" as well.
Such allegations of failure provide further evidence of the debilitating
aporetic mode which emerges in Coleridge's prose and poetry. Such debilitating can
certainly be linked to the poet's traumatic personal life, his romantic difficulties and
drug addiction as well as the essential incoherence of Biographia which influences
aporetic tropes within his poetry. However, the debilitating mode may also be
connected to the issues of intentionality and literary history. Perhaps the
manifestations of aporia in the works of Coleridge are bound within modalities of
failure because the poet could not realize any other rhetorical or poetic possibility.
The Romantic emphasis of the limitless capabilities of the imagination produced a
literary and cultural atmosphere in which poetic transcendence was not only deemed
possible, but also, inherently essential. When he could not employ imaginative
efforts to realize such transcendence, Coleridge knew no other opportunity but
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failure. Such an attitude might be further explained by considering the poet's lack of
intentionality. The multiple instances of aporia discussed in this chapter have one
thing in common: they were all arrived at inadvertently. Coleridge never intended to
examine the limits of the poetic imagination, or the paradoxical state which arises
from contradicting philosophy or aesthetic assertion, he arrived at these boundaries
by the strange fate of his historical circumstance and traumatic personal life. In the
following chapters on Tennyson and Stevens, literary history will demonstrate the
ability of the aporetic mode to evolve according to changing circumstances of literary
history and author intentionality. Eventually, the mode becomes less indicative of
failure and debilitation and more productive. Ultimately, such evolution provides a
final argument against the use of negative nomenclature such as "poetic failure." This
nomenclature may be appropriate within a localized examination of Coleridge, but it
is restrictive in an examination of the history of aporia. Coleridge is part of that
history, his inadvertent interrogations of aporetic function represent the early literary
manifestations of the trope, manifestations which demonstrate the literary artist's
struggle with poetry's limits, its impasses and non passages, its aporias.
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Chapter Two
There Lives More Faith in Honest Doubt:

Consolatory Aporia in Tennyson's In Memoriam

In October of 1833, Alfred Tennyson received a letter which was to influence
a major portion of his creative work for the next seventeen years. The letter, written
by his friend Arthur Hallam' s uncle, contained the dark news of Arthur's death. A
small part of the letter, which announces the tragic event and its circumstances, reads
as follows:

Your friend, Sir, and my much loved nephew, Arthur Hallam, is no
more-it has pleased God, to remove him from this first scene of
Existence, to that better World, for which he was Created. He died at
Vienna on his return from Buda, by apoplexy-and I believe his
Remains come by sea from Trieste. (qtd. in Ricks 114)

Arthur was not a mere friend of Tennyson; he was a fellow student at Cambridge, an
early admirer of Tennyson's poetry and, at the time of his death, engaged to
Tennyson's sister Emily. Christopher Ricks succinctly summarizes the importance of
their relationship when he asserts that "the essential fact is simply that Alfred
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Tennyson and his sister loved and needed Arthur Hallam and were loved and needed
by him" (115).
There can be no doubt that Hallam's death deeply influenced Tennyson's
work; yet Arthur was not the first loss suffered by the poet, as he lost his father as
well in March 1831. The death of Dr. Tennyson-whose alcoholism and mental
illness had caused enormous distress to the family throughout Tennyson's childhood,
adolescence, and early adulthood-represents yet another tragedy which would
characterize this dark period in the poet's life. Because Tennyson refrains from
publishing during this time (1832-1842), critics commonly refer to this period as the
"decade of silence." Tennyson was not, however, completely silent, but instead spent
much of his time revising earlier work that contemporary critics had assailed.
Alongside these revisions, Tennyson also became involved with work on
early fragments which were to become part of his elegy In Memoriam A.HR (1849),
anonymously dedicated to his departed friend, Arthur Henry Hallam. The popularity
of the poem and the poet's subsequent popular success is indicative of the intrinsic
value of In Memoriam both as an artistic expression and an investigation of
conflicting modalities of science and religion which define the Victorian period.
Scientific discoveries in the nineteenth century, including early theories of evolution,
were troublesome to many Victorians because such advancements were in direct
conflict with religious and biblical epistemology. Evolutionary theory, brought about

in part by advances in geologic sciences, represented a direct challenge to the biblical
narrative of creation. In In Memoriam, Tennyson attempts to mediate between
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conflicting modes of science and religion, of reason and faith. Furthermore, many of
the poet's contemporaries believed he had found a resolution between the two which
validated religious faith by means of a partial acceptance of competing systems and
philosophies of scientific discovery and technological progress.
Such an affirmation of faith in the face of science is problematic to many
modem critics who consider the speaker's doubt as inherently more momentous than
his resolved faith. Such an interpretation is in contrast with the poem's original
reception and celebration, yet it is indicative of the poem's complexity and resilience.
The major critical problem of In Memoriam parallels the major conflicting modes of
the poem and Tennyson's attempt to resolve such a conflict. How do critics resolve
its conflicting epistemologies ofreligious faith and scientific doubt? Such a question
was confronted early in the poem's critical history. One of the most famous instances
of such a confrontation is Tennyson's son Hallam Tennyson's defense of the poem in
his memoir of his father. This defense is centered on the identification and assertion
of his father's religious beliefs, beliefs which Hallam claimed to be the ultimate
significance of the elegy. Such an argument may be more indicative of Hallam' s
recognition of the unconventional terms of the poem and his need to protect his
father's image than his determination to uncover his father's true intentions. More
recently, T.S. Eliot has argued for the poem's dependence on the figure of doubt: "Its
faith is a poor thing but its doubt is a very intense experience" (138).
Eliot's emphasis on the agency of doubt provides the scholar with impetus to
further investigate this trope. Eliot's interpretation should be read as an invitation. To
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solely examine the ultimate affirmation of faith in this elegy is to neglect much of
Tennyson's meditation. To respond to this neglect, this study will investigate the
possibility of interpreting the poem's instances of doubt as representative ofa larger
mode of aporia which occurs in the work. Functions of aporia in In Memoriam arise
within four distinct elements of the text: I) its multiple manifestations of ineffability,
II) its elegiac genre and the functions of that genre, III) its fragmented composition
and IV) its speaker's anxiety over the poem's reception. Furthermore, this mode will
be more specifically defined in the first two sections through the application of
Derrida's first aporetic type in which:

the nonpassage resembles an impermeability; it would stem from an
opaque existence of an uncrossable border: a door that does not open
or that only opens according to some unlocatable condition, according
to the inaccessible secret of some shibboleth. (Aporias 20)

The final sections of this study attempt to demonstrate how the aporetic mode
becomes a central consolatory force in the poem as it enables rather than disables the
elegy's dialectical and rhetorical stamina to produce new systems of belief and
knowledge.
Much like Coleridge, Tennyson was often troubled by intense anxieties
concerning his own literary abilities. In 1834, Tennyson was asked by Arthur's
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father, Henry Hallam, to contribute a memoir to a posthumous collection of Hallam'
prose and poetry. The poet responded in the following self-effacing language:

I attempted to draw up a memoir of his life and character, but I failed
to do him justice. I failed even to please myself. I could scarcely have
pleased you. I hope to be able at a future period to concentrate
whatever powers I may possess on the construction of some tribute to
those high speculative endowments and comprehensive sympathies
which I ever loved to contemplate; but at present, though somewhat
ashamed of my own weakness, I find the object is yet too near me to
permit of any very accurate delineation. You, with your clear insight
into human nature, may perhaps not wonder that in the dearest service
I could have been employed in, I should be found most deficient.
(qtd. in Ricks 146)

Unlike Coleridge, however, these confessions of literary "deficiency" demonstrate an
ineffability rather than a strict linguistic failure. The possibility of memorializing
Arthur is not completely unattainable, only unattainable at the present moment, "the
object is yet too near me to permit of any accurate delineation."
Similar instances of ineffability arise in the poem itself as well, as the speaker
constantly doubts his own poetic abilities and the capabilities of language. In Section
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XXXVI, Tennyson's speaker is berated and belittled by Urania, the classical muse of
astronomy, who accuses him of incompetence:

Urania speaks with darken'd brow:
'Thou pratest here where thou art least;
This faith has many a purer priest
And many an abler voice than thou. (ll. 1-4)

Tennyson's allusion to Urania is indicative not only of the poet's interest in
astronomy, but of the cultural significance of contemporary discoveries within the
field. Such discoveries, and their accompanying theories, became problematic to the
Victorian Christian as they challenged traditional Judeo-Christian beliefs concerning
planetary creation and stability. In In Memoriam, Tennyson's engagement with
contemporary astronomy becomes a source of poetic doubt which is manifested in
the speaker's comparison of astronomical distance to the distance between life and
death and the more general aporia which occurs as the poet attempts to reconcile the
scientific obstructions to spirituality.
A study by Anna Henchman provides more specific insight into the field of
astronomy in Tennyson's time. In particular, Henchman emphasizes that
contemporary theories of stellar astronomy and stellar decay, and the resulting
implications of such secular theories, were as multiple as they were controversial in
the Victorian age. Theories which negated the stability of the universe as well as
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theories which proposed the ultimate "dissolution of the solar system" (33)
consistently inform the text of In Memoriam, often as analogs to describe the
distance the speaker feels between himself and his lost friend, Hallam. Tennyson's
inclusion of Urania, then, serves a dual function. First, as Henchman has revealed,
Urania becomes a personification of the "astronomical distance" between speaker
and object. Furthermore, as a figurehead of science, the muse is symbolic of the
logical or scientific barriers which surround matters of spirituality. Urania's speech
represents more than the speaker's doubt of his own abilities. Specifically, she doubts
his competence to discuss matters ofreligion, directing him, instead, to focus on
more earthly issues: '"Go down beside thy native rill .... And hear they laurel
whisper sweet I About the ledges of the hill"' (XXXVI, 11. 5-8). If Urania can be
interpreted as giving voice to Tennyson's assessment of his own competence,
ultimately, her directive supports the assertion that the poem is centered on doubt
rather than faith, a doubt which emphasizes the speaker's own admissions of
ineffability in the inexplicable convergence of science and religion.
In the previous instance, the manifestation of ineffability is directly related to
the speaker's troubled spirituality. In other passages, Tennyson's speaker's
comments rise above this debate to identify the broader failure of language to
produce meaning. In Section LXXV, the speaker laments the fact that he cannot
adequately express the esteem he holds for his lost friend. Instead, he focuses on the
impossibility to use language to assert or describe a feeling or object:
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What practice howsoe'er expert
In fitting aptest words to things,
Or voice the richest-toned that sings,
Hath power to give thee as thou wert? (II. 5-8)

Even the best words, the speaker asserts, cannot reproduce Hallam as he was when
he was alive. While it informs a broader mode of aporia, this specific lament also
touches on the difficulties the speaker encounters as he attempts to honor his dead
friend.
Such difficulties arise from Tennyson's idealist recognition of the
impossibility to transcend the self, a recognition which emerges from meditations on
the boundary between life and death. This impossibility is most apparent in CVIII, a
section immediately following the speaker's meditation on the anniversary of
Hallam' s birth. In CVIII, the speaker's despair is qualified by his promise to refrain
from isolating himself from the rest of humanity in his grief (II. 1-4). He questions
the usefulness of his desire to eulogize Hallam, and in an especially poignant stanza,
comments on the impossibility to transcend the self and grasp the desired object:

What find I in the highest place,
But mine own phantom chanting hymns?
And on the depths of death there swims
The reflex of a human face. (II. 9-12)
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In the search for Hallam, or for the appropriate representation of his feelings
surrounding the loss of Hallam, Tennyson's speaker finds nothing but his own
writing, the "phantom chanting hymns" which reveal nothing but his own reflection,
"the reflex of a human face." The inherent paradox of this passage, that description of
anything outside the self is impossible because the individual is unable to describe
anything but itself, is representative of the essential impasse which characterizes
specific functions of aporia. The idealist realization that reality depends upon
individual observation cannot be reconciled with the speaker's desire to attain
knowledge of an object. The Jines are extremely similar to two lines from
Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode:" "I may not hope from outward forms to win I The
passion and the life, whose fountains are within" (II. 45-46). However, Tennyson's
allusion to the "depths of death" creates a significant departure from Coleridge's
lines. Whereas the separation of subject/object in "Dejection" is absolute; the
impasse of Tennyson's quatrain is dependent upon the boundary between mortality
and death. Early in the elegy, Tennyson's speaker personifies this boundary as a
Death-like figure, "the Shadow fear'd of man":

Who broke our fair companionship,
And spread his mantle dark and cold,
And wrapt thee formless in the fold,
And dull'd the murmur on thy lip,
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And bore thee where I could not see
Nor follow, tho' I walk in haste,
And think, that somewhere in the waste
The Shadow sits and waits for me. (XXII, IL 12-20)

The boundary is further described in the final stanza of section LVI which follows
Tennyson's famous depiction of evolutionary Nature, as "red in tooth and claw"
(l.15). The speaker's realization of the cruelty of natural law leads him to yearn for
Hallam's voice:

0 life as futile, then, as frail!
0 for thy voice to soothe and bless!
What hope of answer, or redress?
Behind the veil, behind the veil. (IL 25-28)

However, access to that voice is separated by a "veil." Because of the multiple
religious and ceremonial connotations of the word, Tennyson's use of veil creates
certain hermeneutical challenges. In Christian liturgical traditions, the veil is used to
honor and protect the Eucharist. Tennyson most certainly would have been familiar
with the tabernacle veil and chalice veil. Given the elegiac mode of In Memoriam,
however, the veil in Section L VI is most likely intended to conjure associations of
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mourning. The speaker's desire to access Hallam's "voice" is blocked by the
boundary of the "veil" of death. This boundary is not "impossible" as in Derrida's
third aporetic type, but rather-"impermeable." The impasse emerges from the
"opaque existence of an uncrossable border" (Aporias 20), the border of death, which
Tennyson's speaker, because he is among the living rather than the dead, can
contemplate but not pass through. The speaker may realize that "redress" exists, but
he cannot gain admittance "behind the veil." Furthermore, because Tennysonian
aporia allows for such contemplation, as opposed to the debilitating mode which
emerges in Coleridge's works, the speaker's realization of the distance or gap
between subject and object is not representative of a terminal phase of In
Memoriam 's aporetic processes. That this realization is, in fact, consolatory, can be
demonstrated within further investigations of the text's essential elements.
In any analysis of In Memoriam, it is important to acknowledge the more
immediate concerns of the poem as an affectionate elegy written on the occasion of
the author's loss of a dear friend. But the elegy, of course, is part of a longer poetic
tradition, a tradition which Tennyson both honors and departs from. In an
examination of early rituals associated with the vegetation gods, Peter M. Sacks
identifies the traditional elegy as containing certain conventions, among them: the
"ceremonial structure," which "place[s] the dead, and death itself, at some cleared
distance from the living" (19); the element of catharsis or "basic passage through
grief or darkness to consolation and renewal" (20); "elegiac questioning," which
set[ s] free the energy locked in grief or rage and to organize[ s] its movement in the
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form of a question that is not merely an expression of ignorance but a voicing of a
protest" (22); and the trope of repetition which "creates a sense of continuity, of an
unbroken pattern such as one may oppose to the extreme discontinuity of death" (23).
In Memoriam contains all four of these conventions. Structurally, the poem is

organized around three descriptions of Christmas and ends with the epithalamium for
Tennyson's sister's wedding. Its cathartic function depends upon Tennyson's
proposal of the concept of "moral evolution" which is introduced in the Prologue and
further expounded in the Epilogue. The poem's "elegiac questioning" is fulfilled by
the speaker's constant questioning of faith, which becomes problematic as it is
juxtaposed with modem science. Finally, Tennyson's use ofrepetition may be most
apparent in the strict adherence to meter (abba).
While the poem certainly adheres to many standard conventions of the elegy,
it departs from the genre in many significant ways. John D. Rosenberg identifies two
such departures as the poem's great length and transgressive quality. Of its length,
Rosenberg claims:

In Memoriam is a slow, winding procession that, like mourning,

circles back upon itself even as it progresses. It is six times longer
than "Adonais," fifteen times longer than "Lycidas." [Tennyson]
strains the generic seams of the elegy to the bursting point, yet he
remains eminently Victorian in mourning at such elaborate length.
(41)
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Rosenberg's claim that Tennyson's particular form of mourning represents a
"Victorian" approach is complicated by his identification of the poem's trangressive
quality which is inherently opposed to Victorian decorum. The transgressive,
Rosenberg asserts, is most evident early on in the poem in passages which exhibit "a
crossing of borders that normally separate the living from the dead, the natural from
the supernatural one sex or species from another" (36). Rosenberg cites Section II as
evidence of this border-crossing:

And gazing on thee, sullen tree,
Sick for thy stubborn hardihood,
I seem to fail from out my blood
And grow incorporate into thee. (II. 13-16)

Certainly, these particularities of genre are illuminating. Yet the poem's membership

in the poetic tradition of the elegy also contributes significantly to its aporetic mode.
A contemporary poem, W.S. Merwin's "Elegy," succinctly summarizes the futility
and ineffability which mark this genre in a single question: "Who would I show it
to?" Ultimately, the elegy is a poetic text written for the dead, which the dead can
never read. The elegiac aporia of In Memoriam emerges from such paradox as the
speaker acknowledges the impassable gap between subject and object while
simultaneously and persistently attempting to address or name that object. More
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simply, Tennyson's speaker undertakes a poetic errand he has already recognized as
impossible. Critical work by David W. Shaw-who provides further evidence of the
paradoxical quality of the elegiac genre-and Erik Gray-who recognizes the
apostrophic difficulties in the poem- further support an identification of the poem's
dual, contradicting processes. Furthermore, the uncovering of such processes
ultimately reveals a specific connection between In Memoriam 's elegiac aporia and
Derrida's first aporetic type.
In his poststructuralist analysis of elegiac paradox, Shaw identifies two modes
of elegiac "tremor": first, the "tremulous ripple effect of a verbal ambiguity or twoway meaning;" and second, the "transgress[ion] [of] a code" or convention (219).
This second mode is paid exhaustive attention in the examination of "six more
specific ways in which Tennyson's elegies transgress other earlier conventions" with
the ultimate aim of uncovering the essential paradox of the genre first identified by
'
Tzetvan Todorov (220). Such a paradox is evident in the fact that these

transgressions both uncover and undermine the genre's conventions. Shaw's
realization of the dual and paradoxical processes of "uncover[ing]" and
"undermin[ing]" within In Memoriam is further informed by Erik Gray's recognition
of the speaker's "difficult" search for "someone or something to address" in the
beginning stanzas of the poem (xx). Gray identifies five separate attempts of the
speaker to name his object: "Old Yew" (II, I. 1), "O Sorrow" (III, I. 1), "O heart" (IV,

I. 5), "Dark house" (VII, I. 1) and "Fair ship" (IX, I. 1). Gray's recognition of these
apostrophic difficulties is sufficient but not completely comprehensive. In fact, such
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difficulty is further compounded by the fact that many of these attempts of the
speaker contain multiple representations of the addressed object. The hauntingly
beautiful lines of the third stanza show such representations beginning with "O
Sorrow" and followed by further epithets: "cruel fellowship," "O Priestess in the
vaults of Death" and "O sweet and bitter in a breath," (III, II. 1,2,3). "Dark house" is
followed by "Doors, where my heart was used to beat" (VII, II. 1,3). In stanza nine,
"Fair Ship" becomes "My friend, the brother of my love" and finally the impossible
"My Arthur, whom I shall not see" (IX. II. 1,16,17). The fluctuation of address
demonstrates the speaker's impulse to search for his object in abstract terms initially,
and, as he continues, in progressively more concrete and specific language.
Additionally, the various terms employed to describe the object each become unique
epithets for Hallam as the speaker attempts to locate not only his friend, but the loss
of this friend.
More significantly- the multiplicity of object, and the multiplicity of epithet
within each object, in the beginning stanzas of the poem- ultimately create an
incoherent analog. The tenor or ground of such an analog is understood to be the
implicit "you" the speaker is attempting to address. Because it is not altered, it can be
considered stable. The vehicle or figure of the analog, however, is constantly in flux.
Gray identifies five vehicles and within those five, three contain multiple variations.
Such morphology of vehicle-the continuous adjustment of the metaphor's source by
the speaker-admits the poetic impossibility of a suitable metaphor for Hallam while
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simultaneously demonstrating, yet again, the un-passable gap between subject and
object, which inevitably exists in the system of an elegy.
This dual process further affirms Shaw's assertion of the poem's elegiac
function, but also reveals the link between the function of aporia in In Memoriam and
Derrida's third aporetic type: the impasse of"a door that does not open or that only
opens according to some unlocatable condition, according to the inaccessible secret
of some shibboleth" (Aporias 20). Derrida's assertion that this aporetic type depends
upon "some unlocatable condition" directly corresponds to the inability of
Tennyson's speaker to locate the appropriate vehicle to represent Hallam. Yet the
speaker's persistence, his attempt to utilize five vehicles and multiple variations
within three of those vehicles, reveals a specific condition of possibility. The speaker
of the elegy does not, as Coleridge's speakers often do, submit to the failure of
transcendence, but rather continues to attempt to find, to locate, the condition in
which he might succeed. Derrida's use of the word "shibboleth" presents some
interpretative difficulty. However, one possible analysis might include an explication
of the term as representative of the two epistemological modes which the poem
fluctuates between: the shibboleths of Christian faith and scientific doubt. Both
modes, Tennyson's speaker seems to assume, contain the potential to reveal some
"inaccessible secret." Contemporary scientific discoveries in fields of geology,
evolutionary science and astronomy revealed massive and groundbreaking data in
Tennyson's day. Similarly, Christianity, with its mystery, ritual, and imaginative
allure must also be assumed to have been an attractive in ways both "inaccessible"
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and "secret." Tennyson's traversal between these two extremities may also be seen as
an attempt to locate the "unlocatable," and to untangle the incoherent analog which
inevitably emerges in the elegiac genre.
The persistent attempts of the speaker to resolve the incoherent analog are
representative of a significant aspect of the poem's aporetic mode. Specifically,
Tennysonian aporetic function departs from the debilitation which occurs in
Coleridge's work because the speaker consistently seeks out new methods when
faced with failure and incoherence. Tennyson's apostrophic usage of"Fair Ship,"
which is carried over into a latter section of the elegy, has led one critic to examine
the poem's navigation imagery and assert the poem's positive agency. Allan C.
Christensen asserts that Tennyson's admissions of failure and linguistic inadequacy
are identified as "strategic" because they ultimately result in "sources of inspiration"
which save the poem from the speaker's abandonment. Comparing In Memoriam
with G.M. Hopkins's "The Wreck of the Deutschland," Christen recognizes that
climactic passages in both poems lead to strategic modifications from negative
commentary on narrative progresses to modes of"more positive confidence" (394).
Ultimately, Christensen argues for an evolutionary narrative of both "The Wreck"
and In Memoriam, a narrative which "investigat[es] the possibilities of language" and
in the process, "leads both poets to a new linguistic mastery" (402). Similarly,
Shaw's discussion of themes of contradicting modes of "forgetting and
remembering" (221) and "brokenness and continuity" (224) illustrate "the process of
a genre's breakdown and renewal" (228). The identification of such a process also
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allows for the identification of its positive effect on Tennyson's creative capabilities,
an effect which allows the poet to recognize the break from old elegiac convention
and forces him to seek new, evolved methods of elegy (229).
The inevitable incoherence of the elegy should cause any poet a fair amount
of anxiety over his work's intents and outcomes, and Tennyson would not have been
an exception. It's important to remember, here, that In Memoriam was written in
fragments over a long period of time. Tennyson himself describes the process in the
following terms:

The sections were written at many different places, and as the phases
of our intercourse came to my memory and suggested them. I did not
write them with any view of weaving them into a whole, or for
publication, until I found that I had written so many.
(qtd. in Gray's "Introduction")

In a study of"loss" in In Memoriam, Irene Hsiao further explores Tennyson's
admissions of the poem's unfinished and fragmented quality by recognizing two
early title considerations for the poem: "Fragments of an Elegy" and "The Way of the
Soul." The first, Hsia argues "implies something unfinished, shattered, the shards of
something unpieceable, yet it is also within sight of a cognizable whole: the elegy"
(173). "The Way of the Soul," on the other hand, "is too complete, suggesting a
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narrative, a journey arriving at its proper destination" (173). Hsai goes on to argue
that the poem's fragmented, sectional form and the circular rhyme and meter of its
stanzas advance a mode of infinite loss and mourning with no actual "consolation of
formal finitude" (194). However, her recognition of the tension between the two title
considerations is also indicative of Tennyson's uncertainty of the specific value of
the poem.
This uncertainty, coupled with Tennyson's admissions of the poem's
fragmentation, its continuous starting and stopping, must be assumed to have
paralleled the poet's continuous questioning of the value of compositions in the
elegiac genre. Such questioning, of course, is what gives the final assemblage its
rhetorical and dialectical depth as it forces the speaker to continually attempt to
justify his creative failure. Eliot describes the fragmentary composition of In

Memoriam in the following terms: "It is unique: it is a long poem made by putting
together lyrics, which have only the unity and continuity of a diary, the concentrated
diary of a man confessing himself. It is a diary of which we have to read every word"
(136). Eliot's identification of the confessional mode of the poem is useful in that 1)
it lends some coherence to the poem's fragmented form and 2) it justifies the
speaker's admissions of doubt. Tennyson's speaker's confessions allow him to
express the poem's failure and attempt to resolve or explain such failure. Such
attempts, are not, in themselves, admissions of the inability of the speaker to console
himself. Instead, the speaker finds consolation in the act of honoring his deceased
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friend. Such an act, as well as the consolation it brings, is especially evident in the
final two stanzas of Section VIII:

So seems it in my deep regret,
0 my forsaken heart, with thee
And this poor flower of poesy
Which little cared for fades not yet.

But since it pleased a vanish'd eye,
I go to plant it on his tomb,
That if it can it there may bloom,
Or dying, there at least may die. (II. 17-24)

The passage describes the speaker's use of poetry, which he compares to a flower
laid on the grave, to honor Hallam. The two stanzas are characterized, first, by the
speaker's admissions of creative failure. The "flower of poesy" is "poor" and "little
cared for." And yet, the same flower also retains some strength and potential: it
"fades not yet," and once "pleased a vanish'd eye" (Hallam was an early admirer of
Tennyson's poetry). Ultimately, however, it is the act itself which is valuable as the
speaker admits that whether the flower "die" or "bloom," "at least" the offer itself
was made.
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While this passage emphasizes the consolation the poet receives through the
value of poetic offering in spite of creative failure, other sections achieve consolation
by focusing on the value inherent in the actual writing process. In Section V, which
immediately follows his search for an object, the speaker admits to the failure of the
poem to access Hallam and confesses "I sometimes hold it half a sin I To put in
words the grief! feel" (11. 1-2). Immediately following, however, the speaker's
recognition of his failure is justified by his assertion that the poetic act is a useful
process for the control of grief. The writing process becomes a consolation to the
writer:

But, for the unquiet heart and brain,
A use in measured language lies;
The sad mechanic exercise,
Like dull narcotics, numbing pain. (V, ll. 5-8)

The speaker's admission of this self-motivated aspect of the writing process, while it
demonstrates concrete evidence of the consolatory mode, also acts as a source for
further anxieties about the imagined reception of the poem. In section XX, which so
beautifully alludes to the tradition of the pastoral elegy, the speaker considers three
criticisms which might be brought against the poet: the poet's extreme
sentimentality, which " ... would make weakness weak I and melt the waxen hearts of
men" (XXI, II. 7-8); the poet's superficial determination to receive praise, "'He loves
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to make a parade of pain I That with his piping he may gain I The praise that comes
to constancy"' (XX!, II. 10-12); and the poet's neglect of more public issues and
problems for private, selfish interests:

A third is wroth: Is this an hour
For private sorrow's barren song,
When more and more the people throng
The chairs and thrones of civil power? (XXI, II. 13-16)

This final criticism leads its speaker, the third "traveler" who criticizes the speaker of
the poem, to further consider the poem's neglect of scientific issues, as he continues
his question of timing:

A time to sicken and to swoon,
When Science reaches forth her arms
To feel from world to world, and charms
Her secret from the latest moon? (XXI, II. 17-20)

Obviously, these criticisms represent manifestations of the speaker's constant
doubt and the poem's aporetic mode. However, they also provide a paradigm for the
consolatory agency of such a mode. Tennyson's emphasis on the final criticism, to
which he devotes two stanzas as compared to the two and three lines of the previous
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two criticisms, is indicative not only of his interest in science but of the quantity of
guilt and failure he experiences as he neglects this subject. Such an experience
becomes productive in the poem because it represents an exigency or impetus to
refute the critique, ultimately allowing for the speaker's concentration on scientific
subjects such as evolutionary theory. Tennyson's anxieties over his talent and critical
reception, in other words, enable renewed and vigorous examinations of scientific
topics which may be viewed as attempts of the poet to invalidate his imagined poetic
deficiencies. Furthermore, Tennyson's scientific examinations are not without a
concrete product. By the end of the elegy, Tennyson provides a possible resolution to
the conflict of science and religion by predicting that humanity will undergo a moral
evolution, a philosophy which comes to fruition in the Epilogue as Tennyson
imagines his sister's child's conception and embryonic development:

A soul shall draw from out the vast
And strike his being into bounds,

And, moved thro' life of lower phase,
Result in man, be born and think,
And act and love, a closer link
Betwixt us and the crowning race .... (11. 123-128)
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Undoubtedly this application of evolutionary theory to the religious dilemma of the
Victorian era represents one of the greatest achievements of the poem. However, it
may not be the only application of evolutionary theory Tennyson endorses. The
constant dialectic between doubt and faith can also be interpreted to mirror
evolutionary theory. The speaker's many doubts and failures throughout the poem,
his expressions of anxiety and ineffability, are part of a larger aestheticcompositional mode which seeks to identify and terminate futile artistic rhetoric to
clear a path for more qualified rhetoric. Furthermore, Tennyson's tendency to reexamine and re-write enables the poem's central consolation. Tennyson achieves this
consolation precisely because he persists in valuing the dialectic process rather than
succumb to his many spiritual doubts and poetic anxieties. Recognizing that the
melancholia of the speaker does not mandate an elegiac failure, Peter M. Sacks
comes to a similar conclusion concerning the consolatory value of the poem:

Throughout, In Memoriam reveals the melancholic's self-love and
self-doubt, his guilt and self-contempt ... his distrust of mediation,
especially that of his own language, and his reluctance to accept any
remedy for grief. And yet, In Memoriam does eventually represent a
successful work of mourning, one whose intriguing aspect is not
Tennyson's skepticism- "the quality of his doubt"-but rather the
unique if tortuous way in which he achieves consolation by revising
rather than rejecting the constrains of his own melancholia. (169)
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This revision, as Sacks calls it, is perhaps most evident in Section CVI, a sequence of
anaphoric stanzas which celebrates the extinction of old, ineffectual modes and the
arrival of a new, more ethical humanity:

Ring out the old, ring in the new
Ring, happy bells, across the snow:
The year is going, let him go;
Ring out the false, ring in the true.

Ring in the valiant man and free,
The larger heart, the kindlier hand;
Ring out the darkness of the land,
Ring in the Christ that is to be. (II. 5-8, 29-32)

Such a mode may have been first identified by J.L. Kendall in "A Neglected
Theme in Tennyson's In Memoriam." Acknowledging the failure of critics to
recognize an essential element of In Memoriam 's narrative "progression" from doubt
or "despair" to its ultimate affirmation of faith, Kendall asserts that the elegy consists
of an essential failure, and an accompanying attitude toward that failure, which
together represent the "indispensible conditions of [the poem's] ultimate success"
(414). Kendall traces the processes of defeat and success through the four sections of
the poem and reasserts that the final affirmative attitudes of the speaker are caused by
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his "unequivocal acceptance of defeat," an acceptance which allows for the speaker's
evolution toward a tranquil and productive faith (420).
Kendall's usage of the vague terms "failure" and "success" are indicative of
the study's general lack of a critical framework in which such terms might be more
precisely identified. The "failure" of In Memoriam and the speaker's attitude toward
that failure may be more specifically interpreted as Tennyson's confrontation with
Derrida's first aporetic type, the "impasse ... of a door that does not open or that only
opens according to an unlocatable condition" (20). The sense of possibility evoked
by this type of aporia, its unlocatable condition" which might allow passage, permits
the speaker of the poem to continue to search for that condition in spite of blockages
and failures. While Kendall's nomenclature differs from the classifying terms of this
study, his recognition of the evolutionary processes which lead to the poem's
ultimate achievement parallel my own assertion of an evolutionary aestheticcompositional mode. A more succinct paradigm of this mode can be identified as a
dual process of causation in which Tennyson recognizes the futility of the elegiac
form which leads him to further anxieties of audience. These anxieties, in turn,
enable the emphasis of evolutionary theory, which allows the poet to produce the
ultimate epistemological system of moral evolution. Such processes not only
celebrate manifestations of aporia and doubt; they require these manifestations. It is
doubt which enables Tennyson his ultimate resolution, and it is T~nnyson's
recognition of the positive agency of doubt which is the other great achievement of

In Memoriam, an elegy in which "There lives more faith in honest doubt, I Believe
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me, than in half the creeds" (XCVI, IL 11-12).
In the previous study of aporetic function in Coleridge's prose and poetry, I
have argued that Coleridge arrives at instances of debilitating aporia inadvertently,
without any specific intention. What I have attempted to demonstrate in this study of
Tennyson's In Memoriam is that the aporia which arises in this elegy functions, not
as a debilitating mode, but as a productive mode of consolation. While instances of
doubt and despair may result in creative blockage or debilitating despair, these
effects are largely temporary within the poem. That is, such blockages do not result
in the termination or complete abandonment of the work's poetic and rhetorical
systems. The impasses do, however, allow Tennyson to realize when and why a
particular epistemological strategy fails and to correct this failure through the attempt
of alternate strategies. Such a position certainly raises questions concerning
intentionality and literary history. Could Tennyson have been aware of the
productive potential made available by aporetic systems? Furthermore, what
circumstance of literary history or biography allows for the evolution of the aporetic
function from debilitating, in Coleridge's work, to productive and consolatory in
Tennyson's? Of course it is possible that Tennyson may have been exposed to the
term aporia, but ultimately, such exposure is irrelevant. The poem itself, its
continuous fluctuations between faith and doubt, spirituality and scientific inquiry,
demonstrates the poet's exposure and employment of the dialectical mode, a mode
which may be viewed as analogous to broader productive functions of aporia. To
assert that the poet actively "employs" the dialectic necessarily includes further
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implicit assertions of Tennyson's intentionality. I will not argue that strategies to
employ the dialectic or aporetic mode were, in any way, premeditated or
preconceived by Tennyson. However, it may be more likely that Tennyson, having
worked on In Memoriam for 17 years, arrived at the knowledge of these strategies as
he confronted his personal doubts and failures as well as the spiritual doubts of the
Victorian age. Furthermore, the overall nature of the Victorian era in which scientific
progress challenged more traditional foundations of religion may also be viewed as
an origin for the dialectical mode of Tennyson's elegy. Finally, the poem's genre
may have also influenced Tennyson's intensions, for the traditional purpose of the
elegy is not debilitating, but productive work which seeks to allow for and facilitate
the grieving process. In the final chapter of this study, which examines functions of
aporia in the poetry of Wallace Stevens, the mode of aporia will evolve even further
in regards to productivity and modernist intentionality. Tennyson's place in this
evolutionary history represents the essential shift of the poetic usage of aporia-from
debilitating or destructive to consolatory and productive, a shift which will
demonstrates, overall, the ability of poets not only to access the boundaries of
language, but to employ those boundaries in fruitful ways.
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Chapter Three
Notes Toward a Koan:
The Aporetic Situation in the Works of Wallace Stevens

One of the most unique aspects of the life of Wallace Stevens- and a
circumstance which sets him apart from Coleridge and Tennyson- is the fact that he
worked as a lawyer both before and during his career as poet. Born in 1879 in
Reading, Pennsylvania, Stevens attended Harvard College from 1897-1900, and, a
few years later, graduated from New York Law School. After working for a variety
of law firms in the first decade after his graduation, Stevens moved to Hartford,
Connecticut to join the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, where he was
eventually named Vice-President in 1834. Stevens continued to work in this position
even as he began publishing poetry frequently in the years following (Brazeau xixiii). The effect of Stevens's professional career on his poetry is not immediately
discernable but becomes more apparent by considering the poet's frequent business
trips, many of which took him to Key West, Florida. Stevens was fascinated with the
tropical climate, which differed so much from his home in the Northeast, and this
fascination surfaced in his creative work in such poems as "The Idea of Order at Key
West" (1936). In this and other works, Stevens's portrayal of the warmth, energy,
and life of the Florida Keys is in direct contrast with the bleakness of a Connecticut
winter and the drudgery of office work. Furthermore, such a contrast also reveals

73

Stevens's particular approach to poetry, written between office hours as a kind of
imaginative escapism. It is this attitude which perhaps most characterizes the
lawyer's creative endeavors. His poetic activity was an escape from his professional
career, a chance for him to find recreation within his own imaginative abilities. More
than anything, the playful curiosity with which Stevens crafted his poems led the
poet to an innovative and experimental aesthetic that allowed him to investigate the
potential and strength of the imagination.
As a connoisseur of art, Stevens maintained a variety of interests. His
penchant for the exotic was not limited to a fascination with the tropical, but
extended, as well, to a fascination with Eastern art and culture. Nowhere is this
fascination more evident than in the multiple references to Asian poetry, painting,
and literature that can be found among his personal notes and correspondences. Even
as early as 1909, long before the publication of his first breakthrough collection
Harmonium (1923), Stevens wrote with subtle fondness and enthusiasm on Chinese
culture in a letter to his future wife, Elsie Moll: "I do not know if you feel as I do
about a place so remote and unknown as China-the irreality of it. So much so, that
the little realities of it seem wonderful and without belief' (Letters 137). Further in
the same letter, Stevens transcribes and praises a poem written by Wang Anshi, a
Chinese poet of the Song Dynasty. "Curious thing," Stevens remarks after describing
the simple beauty of the poem, "how little we know about Asia and all that. It makes
me wild to learn it all in a night" (138). This small example-of which there are
many---ofStevens's appreciation of Eastern art, demonstrates not only his desire to
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gain a cultural education beyond Western traditions, it also reveals an early and
persistent poetic influence.
In recent years, the scholarly work concerning Stevens's influences has been
extensive. J.S. Leonard and C. E. Wharton note the influence of St. Anselm, an
eleventh-century theologian and Archbishop of Canterbury, on Wallace Stevens's
poetic treatment of the "ideal and real." In another study, Mark S. Burrows traces
Stevens's employment of apophatic modes which value creativity and imagination to
similar modes first employed by "mystical writers of the late antique and medieval
periods" (176). Despite these and other enriching contributions, however, few critics
have fully realized or recognized the Eastern (specifically Chinese) tendencies of
Stevens' s poetics, or the factors that may have brought about such tendencies.
The critical impetus of this study, then, is partially based on the attempt to
assuage such critical oversight. When viewed in the context of Eastern literature,
Stevens's "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" (1947) incorporates a poetic system
which is startlingly similar to the Chinese literary genre of the koan. To demonstrate
such similarity, it is first necessary to realize the rhetorical-poetic circumstances in
which the koan-like modality emerges: specifically, the situation of aporia. Much like
Rescher' s definition of an "apory" as "a group of individually plausible but
collectively incompatible theses" (2), the koan operates from the circumstance of a
"double-bind" - a dual set of contentions which cannot, together, be rationally
compatible. The first section of this study is comprised of examinations of aporetic
function in three ofStevens's poems: "The Course ofa Particular" (1950), "The
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Plain Sense of Things" (1952), and "A Clear Day and No Memories" (1954). Two
additional poems will further contextualize the discussion and introduce "Notes":
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" ( 1917), which demonstrates early eastern
influence and technique, and "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman" (1922), which
reveals Stevens's early disillusionment with Western religion and includes his first
mention of the concept of"supreme fiction." Subsequent analysis ofStevens's major
poem "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" provides further elucidation of the
similarities between the koan and functions of aporia. These discussions also attempt
to further define specific modes of aporia by applying Derrida's second aporetic type
in which:'

The nonpassage, the impasse or aporia, stems from the fact that there
is no limit. There is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross, no
opposition between two sides: the limit is too porous, permeable, and
indeterminate. (21)

The final segment of this study attempts to demonstrate how functions of aporia
enable a productive mode in Stevens's "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction."
Discussion of such productivity is then juxtaposed with the central aporetic modes of
debilitation and consolation in Coleridge's and Tennyson's work.
Examinations of the figure of aporia within Stevens's poetic work are not
uncommon in contemporary critical circles; however, the assertion that instances of
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aporia might permit an identifiable product does represent an original critical stance.
Bart Eeckhout, for instance, employs examinations of aporia to reveal Stevens's
treatment of linguistic and literary limitations. Eeckhout' s assertions concerning the
concept of aporia rely on the argument that Stevens casts such limitations in a
negative light by focusing on the inherent aporia "between reality and language"
(265). Such aporias, Eekhout claims, reveal the poet's ultimate embracement of
principles of "totality," as well as "the supremacy oflogic and absolute thought"
(266). Ultimately, Eekhout's examination ofaporetic function in Stevens's work is
somewhat incomplete because he fails to consider not only the productive
possibilities of Stevens' s aporias but also the various modalities in which these
aporias might arise. Perhaps the most distinct of these is Stevens' s use of apophasis

in "The Course of a Particular" (1950).
Somewhat reminiscent of the barren landscapes in Eliot's The Waste Land
(1922), Stevens' s "The Course of a Particular" depicts a desolate scene of "icy
shades and shapen snow" (I. 3) in "the nothingness of winter" (I. 2). The bleakness of
tone and setting immediately becomes a trope essential to the processes of
observation and to the object of that observation, named in the first line: "Today the
leaves cry, hanging on branches swept by wind" (I. 1). This "cry" is repeated
throughout the poem's five stanzas oftercets as it becomes informed by the negative,
apophatic atmosphere of the poem. Such an atmosphere represents not merely
absence or barrenness but the attempt to quantify infinite absence, absence which is
capable of further and further reduction, further lessening: "The nothingness of
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winter" in the second line, "becomes a little less." The cry of the leaves, too, is
subject to such apophasis as the speaker attempts again and again to decipher its
meaning. The speaker can only describe what the cry of the leaves is not: "It is not a
cry of divine attention, I Nor the smoke-drift of puffed out heroes, nor human cry"
(II. 10-11). The various apophatic attempts to name the meaning of the sound
ultimately lead the speaker to a realization of inherent ineffability: "It is the cry of
leaves that do not transcend themselves"(!. 12).
Such ineffability relies on an essentially incoherent analog, the product of
failed rhetorical and poetic processes. Stevens's title "The Course of a Particular,"
consequently, becomes indicative of the failed rhetorical process of the observation
of a particular object or experience. The speaker observes the sound of the winter
foliage but immediately realizes his own failure to interpret its meaning: "It is a busy
cry, concerning someone else" (!. 5). He attempts to describe the object in negative,
apophatic terms but fails again, noting that the leaves fail to "transcend themselves"
(!. 12). Finally, the speaker acknowledges the inherent meaninglessness of his object
of observation and with this acknowledgment abandons the attempted analog. The
leaves signify nothing outside their own existence:

In the absence of fantasia, without meaning more
Than they are in the final finding of the ear, in the thing
Itself, until, at last, the cry concerns no one at all. (II. 13-15)
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The aporetic function of this poem exists within this incomplete analog, one which is
stilted or neglected. The tenor or ground of the poem's major metaphor, the "cry of
the leaves," is left without a vehicle or figure. In formulaic terms, the metaphor is
incomplete; X=Y but Y is undefined. In fact, Y is deemed impossible by the speaker.
Such ineffability in the midst of seasonal destitution is ultimately symbolic not of
earthly desolation but oflinguistic deficiency.
Such a reading is undoubtedly supported by the recent scholarship of Helen
Vendler. Vendler identifies a set of rhetorical tropes in the work of Wallace Stevens
which provides a method of examining the poet's creative evolution and unique style.
These rhetorical tropes, identified as "ifs and ors" and "buts," are indicative of the
fluctuation of"speculation" and the "obstruction of speculation" in Stevens' poetry.
The progression of Stevens' creative work throughout his oeuvre, as Vendler argues,
reflects an initial dependence on these tropes, followed by a period of doubt in which
he questions their rhetorical worth, and a final period in which he abandons such
tropes all together (101 ). Such a model can undoubtedly be applied to the rhetorical
processes of "The Course of a Particular," but Vendler's study also releases the poem
from its own negative and barren energy. Further in the essay, Vendler asserts that
this sequence demonstrates the poet's interest in multiple methods of searching for
truth, methods which ultimately demonstrate that even at his most barren and
thematically desolate, Stevens' rhetorical dialectics are an argument for the depth and
richness of his work rather than its desolation ( 117).
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In "The Plain Sense of Things" (1952), Stevens persists upon the ideational
line of "The Course of a Particular." In certain undeniable ways, "The Plain Sense"
begins where "The Course" ends. Again, the speaker finds himself in the barren
season of winter "after the leaves have fallen" (I. 1); and again he meditates on the
limits of observation. "We return," the speaker asserts, "To a plain sense of
things ... as if I We had come to an end of the imagination" (II. 1, 2-3). It is the same
finale arrived at in "The Course," repeated here as an initial meditation. Such
thematic repetition not only demonstrates Stevens' obsession with the limits of the
imagination, but also his desire to repeat his own arrival at those limits. In spite of
rhetorical and poetic restriction the speaker takes joy in describing epistemological
boundaries: the greenhouse in need of paint, the dilapidated chimney which "slants to
one side," the "great pond and its waste of the lilies" (II. 9,10, 18).
But "The Plain Sense" is not only an imaginative exercise of joy. Stevens's
reiteration of the aporetic trope of imaginative failure is productive as well. The first
product, a system of clear ineffability, is expressed in an instance of metapoesis in
which the speaker comments on compositional process and aesthetic circumstance:

It is difficult even to choose the adjective
For the blank cold, this sadness without cause.
The great structure has become a minor house.
No turban walks across the lessened floors. (II. 5-8)
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It is this system of ineffability which rhetorically enables the second, and more
significant, achievement of the poem: a kind of poetic epiphany in which the speaker
becomes conscious of the startling knowledge that even linguistic and semantic
deficiencies arise out of the imagination:

Yet the absence of the imagination had
Itself to be imagined. The great pond,
The plain sense of it, without reflections, leaves,

Had to be imagined as an inevitable knowledge,
Required, as a necessity requires. (IL 13-15, 19-20)

Stevens explores the same epiphany within systems which are devoid of
metapoetic consciousness. In "A Clear Day and No Memories" (1954), Stevens's
speaker casts off environmental description to focus, instead, on the trope of absence
and semantic void. The poem is not "set" beyond its quotidian title and obscure
negation of atmospheric conditions. "No soldier in the scenery," the speaker asserts,
"Today the mind is not part of the weather. I Today the air is clear of everything." (II.
1, 7-8). The poem's division into two stanzas separates its dual rhetorical processes.
In the first stanza, Stevens' speaker describes the absence of the particular.
Acknowledging the absence of thought, he nonetheless carries the thought forward
by describing the specific details which are negated. The noun phrase "No thoughts
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of people now dead" (I. 2) both refutes the ideation of mental description and
(paradoxically) facilitates the inevitable continuation of thought in the following
lines:

As they were fifty years ago:
Young and living in a live air,
Young and walking in the sunshine,
Bending in blue dresses to touch something- (ll. 3-6)

The subtle punctuation of this passage is telling, as is Stevens' precise use of
anaphora. The colon following line three, which is itself a continuation of the
preceding negation, indicates both the termination of that negation and its generative
effect: the persistence of ideation in spite of negation. The anaphora "Young" in lines
four and five simulates the flow of production caused by this persistence. The two
lines represent an anaphoric stream which demonstrates the surge of creative power
which continues despite organizational or rhetorical restraint. Stevens is especially
interested in the gap between genesis and restraint and in the second and final stanza,
the speaker returns to the restrictive modalities of absence and negation realized in
the clear, blank space of air which "has no knowledge except of nothingness" (I. 9):
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And it flows over us without meanings,
As if none of us had ever been here before
And are not now: in this shallow spectacle,
This invisible activity, this sense. (II. 10-13)

Stevens' evocation of absence reveals the modality's ultimate productivity. Negation
is productive despite the poet's rhetorical and rational attempts to limit that
productivity. What one might call the "agency of absence," as well as Stevens' play
with the modes of restraint and generation, further reveals two important aspects of
his work: first, its dependence upon tropes of aporia, namely ineffability and
apophasis, and second, the agency or productive nature of those tropes.
The various functions and modes of these three poems, the apophasis and
incoherent analog in "The Course," the linguistic deficiency in "The Plain Sense,"
and the agency of absence in "A Clear Day," when viewed together, are
representative of a broader system of productive aporia at work in Stevens' poetics.
To apply this system to Stevens' "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," it is first
necessary to briefly contextualize the discussion with two early poems: "Thirteen
Ways of Looking at a Blackbird" (1917), which demonstrates Stevens's early use of
Eastern poetic devices, and "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman" (1922), which
reveals the poet's initial explorations of the concept of"supreme fiction."
"Thirteen Ways" is enlightened by title and form as much as it is by the
poem's central content. The title immediately contextualizes the work within
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concepts ofrelativism and perspective. The thirteen numbered cantos spring forward
under the directive of this title. Of course, each episode is more than a perspective
aimed at the indicated object of the blackbird. The speaker aims that perspective back
at himself as well, as early as the second canto: "I was of three minds, I Like a tree I
In which there are three blackbirds" (IL 4-6). Consequently, the poem's focus
transcends its immediate object to converse with the difficulty and multiplicity that
surrounds the poet's task of linking signifier to signified. Stevens's division of the
processes of observation and speculation into thirteen fragments not only mirrors the
fragmented modem consciousness but also reproduces the basic aporetic mode
creative language labors under: the impasse or gap between subject and object. In
many instances, this reproduction can be accomplished in a single canto. The cantos
themselves, their brevity and open, fluid endings resemble the eastern tradition of
haiku. The poem also experiments with "metaphorical silence," a literary trope
identified by Yanfang Tang in her comparative study of disparate epistemological
modes in Eastern and Western literatures. Attributing the tactic's origins to Chinese
philosophy, Tang commends the trope in the following terms:

Paradoxical as it may seem, the tactic of silence possesses advantage
unsurpassed by other tactics. It renders to the text gaps and holes that
provoke the reader's imagination and encourage him to search for its
hidden meanings. It liberates the words from their rigid reference so
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that they are transformed from physical marks into artistic symbols.
(20)

In Canto V, Stevens seems to recognize the possibility of metaphorical silence, if not
employ the trope outright: "I do not know which to prefer, I The beauty of inflections

I Or the beauty of innuendos, I The blackbird whistling I Or just after." (II. 1-4).
Perhaps even more pertinent to a discussion of ''Notes" is a brief overview of
Stevens's poem "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman." While the subject of
conventional religion is not a major theme in Stevens's work, the poet's treatment of
Christianity in a select few ·Of his poems demonstrates early disillusionment and
skepticism concerning western orthodoxy. "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman"
(1922) is perhaps the most lucidly demonstrative of such conflicted and quietly
radical views. As is evident in the title, the poem takes the form of a monologue and
is addressed, somewhat disparagingly, to a female Christian figure. The speaker's
derision of this figure is expressed in his formulations of the "high-toned,"
conventional pedantry which comprise her religious outlook. Despite the abstract
diction, the speaker's essential attitude can still be deduced, as can the objective of
his address: to expose such pedantry and farce for the empty rhetoric, ritual, and
meaningless babble in which it is manifested:

Your disaffected flagellants, well-stuffed,
Smacking their muzzy bellies in parade,
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Proud of such novelties of the sublime,
Such tink and tank and tunk-a-tunk-tunk (II. 15-18)

The abstract language of this passage is contrasted in the poem with another system
of diction, a repertoire of architectural and constructive apparatus with which the
poet frames the other central motive of the poem. Upon "naves," "palms," and
"peristyles" the speaker builds the major argument of this poem- that poetry and
religion both emerge from the same source, the imagination:

Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame.
Take the moral law and make a nave of it.
And from the nace build haunted heaven. Thus,
The conscience is converted into palms,
Like windy cytherns hankering for hymns. (II. 1-5)

Most importantly, it is with "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman," in 1922, that
Stevens first introduces his chief poetic thesis: the "supreme fiction" alluded to in the
first line of this abstract and daring poem.
Stevens briefly describes the concept of "supreme fiction" in a biographical
note which accompanied a reprint of his collection The Auroras ofAutumn (1950):
"The author's work suggests the possibility of a supreme fiction, recognized as a
fiction, in which men could propose to themselves a fulfillment" (Letters 820). Of
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course, "Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," is best understood through summary and
explication of the poem itself which is comprised of three sections, or notes, with
each section containing ten cantos. The first section, "It Must Be Abstract," also
includes an invocation. Who or what Stevens invokes is not entirely clear, although it
seems as if he is addressing a personified version of the imagination. "And for what,
except for you, do I feel love," the speaker begins. What is especially significant here
is not only this "love," the praise of the imaginary, but also the celebration of the
reward of the imaginative process: "The vivid transparence that you bring is peace"

(I. 8). The body of the first section is addressed to another object: the "ephebe" or
young man and begins, in Canto I, with the following directive:

Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.

You must become an ignorant man again
And see the sun again with an ignorant eye
And see it clearly in the idea of it. (I, II. 1-6)

The speaker's instructions revolve around the concept of the "first idea," a phrase he
uses consistently in later passages. Such a concept is essentially an acknowledgement
of the idealist philosophy that experience is a product of mental processes; reality is
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nothing but an invention. The ephebe's first task, then, is to realize the artifice of the
world and attempt to cast off false knowledge to return to an existence devoid of
reflection, to consider experience before language. In the following stanzas, the
speaker warns against the creationism of conventional Western religion: "Never
suppose an inventing mind as source I of this idea not for that mind compose I a
voluminous master folded in his fire" (I, II. 7-9). Because the only true creator is the
imagination itself, the idealist realization and the import of the first idea negates the
existence of an external creator: "The death of one god is the death of all ... Phoebus
is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was I A name for something that could never be
named." (I, II. 13, 16-17).
Stevens' s juxtaposition of idealist philosophy with his negation of
Christianity is meant, first and foremost, to prepare the way for the essential
objective of"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction," the search for a fictive (poetic)
surrogate for the idea of God. While Stevens's motives for such an objective can be
somewhat deduced from "A High-Toned Old Christian Woman," discussed above, a
clearer explanation is offered by Milton J. Bates. Recognizing Stevens's relationship
with and interest in the ideas of George Santayana, Bates summarizes the main thesis
of Santayana's Interpretations ofPoetry and Religion (1900) as follows:

According to Santayana, poetry and religion are both human
fabrications, designed to express and at least partly to satisfy our
longing for the ideal. ... Santayana contends that the highest poetry is
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identical with religion. By allowing us a glimpse of the ideal, it
likewise gives direction and meaning to our lives. Because many of
the tenets of traditional religion-eternal damnation, for examplehave become distasteful and no longer satisfy the imagination ...
poetry must step forward to provide us with a new mythology. (49)

"Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction" is, like Santayana's ideas, a response to this need
for a new mythology. However, Stevens wasn't exactly sure how to achieve the
desired result. Specifically, he wasn't entirely sure whether or not the imagination
itself could replace traditional religion, or whether a manifestation of the imagination
was needed. This attitude is especially apparent in a letter written by the poet in
1940:

If one no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible merely to
disbelieve; it becomes necessary to believe in something else.
Logically, I ought to believe in essential imagination, but that has its
difficulties. It is easier to believe in a thing created by the imagination.
A good deal of my poetry recently has concerned an identity for that
thing. (3 70)

And this is where the initial meditations on the "first idea" in Section One of"Notes"
lead the speaker as well: to the recognition that the supreme fiction requires a
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manifestation, "a thing created by the imagination," which would be easier to believe
in than the imagination itself. In this way, Stevens arrives at the primary product of
the first Note, a personification of the essential imagination which might replace
traditional religion, a figure not unlike Nietzsche's Obermensch, MacCullough, the

"major man":

The first idea is an imagined thing.
The pensive giant prone in violet space
May be the MacCullough, an expedient,

Logos and logic, crystal hypothesis,
Incipit and a form to speak the word
And every latent double in the word,

Beau linguist. (VIII, 11. 4-10)

In the following stanzas, the speaker examines the possibilities and implications of

his human abstraction from a variety of angles. The foremost consideration of such a
figure relies on his abstract and universal quality: "The major abstraction is the idea
of man I And major man is its exponent, abler I in the abstract than in his singular"
(X, II. 1-3). Indeed, "major man" seems to be the ultimate achievement of this first
section. However, a third important element of the Note can be realized by

90

acknowledging the aporetic situation which comes after Stevens' s meditations on
idealism but before his proposal for the imagination's human surrogate. As "a thinker
of the first idea" (VII, I. 2), the speaker is caught between the real and the ideal and
yet free from the oppressive systems of western religion: "It feels good as it is
without the giant, .... Perhaps I The truth depends on a walk around a lake" (VII, II.
1-3).
At this juncture in the narrative, Stevens knows that he must offer up a
possibility for belief to achieve his supreme fiction, and yet he seems to delight in the
suspense, in the fundamental tension between the "essential imagination" and the
necessity of "a thing created by the imagination." The inherent paradox of this
tension reveals its aporetic situation: the imagination is supreme because of its ability
to access naked existence and experience, the reality of the first idea. In Derridean
terms, the aporia "stems from the fact that there is no limit" to the agency of the
imagination. "There is not yet or there is no longer a border to cross" precisely
because Stevens purposefully delays such a crossing (Aporias 21). At the same time,
the necessity to devise a representative of imaginative power negates its idealist
capability. However abstract and universal "major man" remains, he is still
representative of an attenuation of the imaginative potency.
Above all, the speaker must feel the immensity and impossibility of the
poem's intent, and yet he is strangely euphoric. "Perhaps there are times of inherent
excellence," he remarks ecstatically, "As when the cock crows on the left and all I Is
well" (VII, II. 9-11 ). The dialectical circumstance experienced by the speaker, as a
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witness among opposing forces of real and ideal, between the first idea and the
realization of the necessity of idea accumulation, is similar to the rhetorical
circumstance of the Chinese literary genre of the koan. In his introduction to Opening
a Mountain: Koans of the Zen Masters, Stephen Heine succinctly defines the koan,
which began in China during the T'ang era (618-917), as "a brief, enigmatic anecdote
or dialogue between two contesting parties." Heine further distinguishes the genre by
identifying its essential element as the "quixotic, paradoxical, and often absurd
utterances" which negate the possibility of logical thought processes and cause a
"spiritual breakthrough to a realm beyond reason" (1 ).
Some of the most canonical koans can be found in the classic Zen text Mumon-kan which can be translated as "no gate barrier" or, as it is translated by Paul
Reps and Nyogen Senzaki in Zen Flesh, Zen Bones, "The Gateless Gate." Reps and
Senzaki provide further explanation of this collection, which was first compiled by
the Chinese master Ekai, also called Mumon, (1183-1260), as well as the literary
genre of the koan:

The work consists of narrated relationships between ancient Chinese
teachers and their pupils, illustrating means employed to sublimate the
dualistic, outgoing, generalizing, intellectualizing tendencies of
students in order that they might realize their true nature .... The
whole intent was to help the pupil break the shell of his limited mind
and attain a second eternal birth, satori, enlightenment. Each problem
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is a barrier. Those who have the spirit of Zen pass through it ... as if
they were seeing the unseen and living in the illimitable. (159-160)

Two elements of this passage connect the koan to the figure of aporia: the assertion
that "each problem is a barrier," and the identification of the koan as a method of
"sublimat[ing] dualistic ... tendencies." Much like poetic instances of aporia, the
koan emerges from two or more competing epistemic or rhetorical assertions. These
assertions create an impasse or aporia precisely because they contradict each other.
The contemplation of such contradiction, in the Zen tradition, is what allows the
"pupil" to achieve "enlightenment." This enlightenment is often explicitly linked to
an idealist realization, the acknowledgment that "reality" is subject to the perceiver.
Consider Case 29 from "The Gateless Gate":

Two monks were arguing about a flag. One said: "The flag is
moving." The other said: "The wind is moving." The sixth patriarch
happened to be passing by. He told them: "Not the wind, not the flag;
mind is moving." (Reps 208).

The competing assertions of movement are presented as individually plausible.
However, together, they cannot both be an accurate assessment of experience. The
patriarch's response to the two monks adds yet another assertion to this group of
contentions; yet, it is an assertion which attempts to demonstrate the concept of
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idealism. However, the patriarch's response is not presented as a solution to the
aporia of the two original contentions; rather, his assertion only magnifies the
paradox. "The Gateless Gate," like most collections of koans, includes commentary
on each case. Mumon further extends the aporia of this case by emphasizing the
patriarch's utterance and challenging the reader to contemplate that utterance: "The
sixth patriot said: 'The wind is not moving, the flag is not moving. Mind is moving.'
What did he mean?" (209).
While Stevens's "Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction" does not include
explicit commentary on the aporias it presents, the work does share another formal
similarity to the koan. Stevens's speaker's instructive address, in the beginning of
the first "Note," to the "ephebe" or young man parallels the tradition of address in the
koan as a "narrated relationship between ... teachers and their pupils" (Reps 159).
But what of the more immediate purpose of the koan? Is it extreme to argue
that Stevens' s aporias, like koans, allow for enlightenment or satori? Perhaps, but the
comparison is not completely speculative. Examination of the Eastern tradition not
only demonstrates how Stevens produced a literature which is heavily dependent
upon koan-Iike duality and contradiction, it also reveals the aporetic requirement of
the koan. If it cannot be called an "enlightenment," perhaps "awakening" is more
appropriate. After all, it is what Stevens names the experience of "inherent
excellence" further on in Canto VII:

Perhaps there are moments of awakening,
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Extreme, fortuitous, personal, in which

We more than awaken, sit on the edge of sleep,
As on an elevation, and behold
The academies like structure in a mist. (VII, II. 17-21)

The fact that Stevens's supreme fiction is fulfilled not in his major human
abstraction, but in a fulfillment or awakening gained through conflicting rhetorical
and poetic thought processes is ultimately indicative of an argument which favors
process over product, which perceives process as product. Such an argument is not,
however, without critical support. In a study of imaginative tropes in twentiethcentury American poetry, Charles Altieri asserts, among other major claims, that
Stevens's treatment of the imaginary is characterized by his valuing of the "intensity"
of the "experience" of imaginative processes, rather than the object or product of
such (85). What Altieri fails to realize, however, is that the value of such processes is
inherently dependent upon Stevens's attempts at production. Bates makes a similar
critical mistake by classifying, and thus separating, the three "Notes" into two
distinct modes of idealism and pragmatism: "The idealist component of the supreme
fiction is most evident in the cantos of "It Must Be Abstract." The pragmatist
component emerges in "It Must Change," in "It Must Give Pleasure," and most
explicitly in the epilogue" (49). It is not the severance or separation of modalities of
pragmatism and idealism that lends the poem its potency and fulfills the supreme
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fiction, but rather their overlapping and dialectic struggle. To return to Canto VII
once again, Stevens seems to allude to such interdependence of the two tropes in the
lines immediately following his first recognition of the experience of "inherent
excellence" during which "all":

Is well, incalculable balances,
At which a kind of Swiss perfection comes

And a familiar music of the machine
Sets up its Schwiirmerei, not balances
That we achieve but balances that happen (VII, II. 11-15).

Of course, Bates's fundamental classification is useful, but its rhetorical
implications do limit the realization of the poem's aporetic achievement. The second
Note, "It Must Change," is pragmatic in the sense that Stevens pays less overt
attention to the concept of the first idea and focuses more on the specific necessities
of the supreme fiction. Foremost among those necessities is the requirement of
modification. And yet, the speculations in this section are still inextricably linked to
the conception of the first idea; the supreme fiction must remain dynamic to refrain
from becoming a cliche, a victim of idea accumulation, to stay as close as possible to
the first idea. Consequently, the trope of change becomes yet another exploration and
commemoration of the essential aporetic situation which is itself the source of such
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change:

Two things of opposite nature seem to depend
On one another, as a man depends
On a woman, day on night, the imagined

On the real. This is the origin of change.
Winter and spring, cold copu!ar, embrace
And forth the particulars ofrapture come. (IV, IL 1-6)

Here again the speaker comments on the fulfilling effect which occurs through the
contemplation of differing forces. The speaker's assertion that "two things of
opposite nature ... depend on one another" rather than contradict or cancel out each
other further qualifies the poem's aporetic type as identified by Derrida. The dual
contentions of the aporia support each other in a specific impasse in which "there is
no opposition between two sides" (Aporias 21). The final significance of the section,
then, lies not in its pragmatism but in its negation of the pragmatic achievement of
the first section. By demanding change, Stevens disqualifies his human abstraction of
the supreme fiction, the "major man." To continue to elaborate this manifestation is
to violate the second Note. Instead, the speaker concludes the section with the
following dictate: "The casual is not I Enough. The freshness of transformation is I
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The freshness of a world. It is our own, I It is ourselves. The freshness of ourselves"
(X, II. 14-18).
Like the second Note, the third and final section, "It Must Give Pleasure," is
also concerned with further requirements of the supreme fiction which must be
arranged "To speak of joy and to sing of it, borne on I The shoulders of joyous men,
to feel the heart I That is the common, the bravest fundament" (I, II. 1-6). The speaker
also reiterates that it is process rather than product that is inevitably involved in such
a requirement, following these lines with the simple and direct, "This is a facile
exercise" (I, I. 7). The music and imagery of this section is especially gorgeous and
abstract, and yet the cantos do not veer from the original exigencies of the first two
sections. The speaker is still very concerned with the essential concept of the first
idea and the aporias that surround that concept. However, the circumstances of that
aporia are modified somewhat, in compliance with the second Note, "It Must
Change." In Canto VII, Stevens again celebrates the possibility of communion with
the first idea but frames it in the apophatic terms of fiction removal. To approach the
first idea, one must relinquish false conceptions until only one remains: "To find the
real, I To be stripped of every fiction except one, I The fiction of an absolute-Angel,

I Be silent in your luminous cloud and hear I The luminous melody of proper sound"
(VII, II. 17-21).
The logical impossibility of such a paradoxical task, much like the competing
modalities in the first Note, creates an aporetic situation which causes the speaker to
doubt his own directive and launch into a series of questions in which he interrogates
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his own assertions concerning formulations of the absolute (the angel mentioned in
the previous passage): "What am I to believe? ... Am I that imagine this angel less
satisfied? I Are the wings his, the lapis-haunted air? I Is it he or is it I that experience
this?" (VIII, IL 1, 8-10). Such questioning is ultimately indicative of the poem's
fulfillment of Derrida's final specification of the second aporetic type which emerges
from the condition of a limit which is "too porous, permeable, and indeterminate"

(Aporias 21). The speaker's doubt, his inability to accurately realize a definite
course of belief, arises from a comprehension of the indeterminacy of the absolute.
And again, much like the stanzas of Canto 7 in "It Must Be Abstract," the dilemmatic
eventually leads to the ecstatic as the speaker experiences another "awakening" of
koanistic proportions: "there is an hour I Filled with expressible bliss, in which I
have I No need, am happy, forget need's golden hand, I Am satisfied without
solacing majesty ... there is a time I In which majesty is a mirror of the self: I have
not but I am and as I am, I am." (VIII, 11. 11-14, 16-18).
Despite the rapture apparent in these lines, critics continue to doubt the
success of Stevens's major work. Gregory Brazeal, for instance, recognizes the
poet's desire to construct a "supreme fiction" which might act as a creative surrogate
for "the idea of God" but asserts that such an endeavor is never actually achieved:

'Notes [Toward a Supreme Fiction]' as the title suggests, does not
present us with any examples of supreme fiction; rather, it offers some
preparation of the grounds for the arrival of one. It leads us in a series
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of peregrinations toward a supreme fiction, but stops short of the
promised land. (99)

What is evident in this passage is that Brazeal fails to consider that Stevens' s
supreme fiction is not dependent upon any concrete product, an "example" or
"arrival" but on the euphoric effects of the flight towards that product. It is Stevens' s
"peregrinations" which are, in fact, both the beginning and the end of his fictive
realization, an assertion which the poet further maintains in the penultimate Canto of
the third Note:

These things at least comprise
An occupation, an exercise, a work,

A thing final in itself and, therefore, good:
One of the vast repetitions final in
Themselves and, therefore, good, the going round

And round and round, the merely going round,
Until merely going round is a final good,
The way wine comes at a table in a wood. (IX, II. 9-15)

JOO

To refute Brazeal's claim, of course, is to argue that Stevens did, in fact, achieve the
supreme fiction. To make this claim, it is necessary to view Stevens's achievement.
not as his creation of the "major man" abstraction, but rather, as his
acknowledgement of the enlightenment which becomes possible within the aporia
which inevitably accompanies the immediate difficulties of that creation. Stevens's
employment of the aporetic allows enlightenment because he gives a glimpse into an
epistemological opportunity: simply, the opportunity to deconstruct subject/object
duality. Furthermore, while this process may mirror the functions of the koan,
Stevens does not assert or recommend a renewal of interest in Zen practices, or any
religious creed, for that matter. In fact, "Notes Towards a Supreme Fiction" is
representative of a distinctly anti-Christian stance, one which inevitably emerges as
atheistic. The intent of this chapter is not, however, to argue that Stevens's negation
of creationism ideology, and his creation of a secular "supreme fiction," might serve
as a replacement for Christian systems. Instead, the poem should be viewed as a
secular vision which allows for an alternate spiritual system, a path to a kind of
secular satori in which we might find peace, change, and pleasure at the boundaries
of poetic language.
In the previous chapters of this study, I've attempted to demonstrate a
tangible shift in the way the figure of aporia is employed in the works of Coleridge
and Tennyson. I've asserted that aporetic function in Coleridge's prose and poetry is
both inadvertent and debilitating due to various circumstances of biography, literary
history, and intentionality. T«nnyson's "use" of the figure, I've explained, becomes
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somewhat more productive for two reasons: first, the system of the elegy requires
that its speaker attempt to attain consolation; and second, In Memoriam demonstrates
an increased intentionality as Tennyson becomes aware of the dialectical possibilities
the figure of aporia affords. In Stevens's poetry, the aporetic becomes both more
productive and more intentional. The productive quality of Stevens' s work, of
course, depends upon the argument that the poet did, in fact, create a secular
"spiritual fulfillment" apart from conventional Christian religious systems. Stevens' s
intentionality may be explained in the fact that the poet deliberately set out to create
such a system, and that his employment ofkoan-like aporias represent an awareness
of the possibilities inherent in the impasse or double-bind. Literary history plays a
role in the progressed intentionality of Stevens' s aporias as well. As a Modernist,
Stevens wrote poetry which exerts a conscious and deliberate aesthetic to deal with
the concept of idealism, the rejection of absolutes, and the oppositional pressures
between reality and the imagination. That his poetic ambitions were representative of
hobby or leisure, at least early in his life, further elucidates his intentional stance.
Stevens had neither needed nor wanted to adopt traditional poetic molds. Rather, he
desired to experiment, to inquire into the possibilities of poetic thought and language,
and to drive such possibilities ever forward to the limits of the imagination.
Ultimately, such desire not only explains the productive aporetic mode in Stevens's
poetry, it also reveals the final development in the poetic figure's evolution. This
development- the achievement and acknowledgement of the productive possibilities
of aporia- must not only be recognized and disseminated by literary critics, it must
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be utilized by literary artists to create work which is able to positively transform and
give purpose to life's doubts, puzzlements, and aporias.
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